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SHRIMP SUPPLY CHAINS, COMMON PROPERTY AND POLLUTION 
MANAGEMENT: A CASE STUDY OF TAM GIANG CAU HAI LAGOON 
 
By 
Truong Chi Hieu 
  
Tam Giang Cau Hai (TGCH) Lagoon is the largest wetland system in Southeast Asia with 
an area of 21,467ha and a coastal length of 70km. Shrimp culture is one of the main livelihoods of 
local communities, which total about 300,000 inhabitants. The purpose of this study was to 
identify factors constraining the Lagoon’s shrimp supply chain and to recommend ways of 
improving chain performance.  
 The TGCH shrimp industry was investigated within a supply chain framework. Given the 
lack of prior information about the structure of the chain and its performance, this investigation 
was exploratory, and used a qualitative methodology. The investigation showed that the TGCH 
shrimp supply chain was dysfunctional due to production losses linked to contaminants and 
associated disease conditions in the waters of the Lagoon.  
There are several pollution sources including at least: (i) aquaculture production and other 
livelihood activities in the lagoon; (ii) agricultural production activities in upstream areas; and (iii) 
industrial production and urban dwellers in the lagoon catchment. Within the bounds of this thesis, 
it was decided to focus on the endogenous pollution from within the Lagoon, which was 
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considered the most important and complex of the pollution issues, while recognising that a 
comprehensive solution would also require consideration of exogenous sources. 
An analysis of the pollution problem using theory relating to common pool resources 
attributed the pollution caused by shrimp culture to recent changes in property rights to lagoon 
resources. In particular, the lagoon bed had been privatised to shrimp farmers while the lagoon 
water remained an open-access resource.. Shrimp farmers are therefore able to internalise the 
benefits of shrimp culture while externalising their pollution costs. The consequent over-
exploitation of the water is exacerbated by a lack of appropriate aquaculture zoning in the lagoon.  
To solve the pollution problem, it is first necessary to open waterways adjacent to the 
privatised farms to help dissipate pollutants. Currently these waterways are partially blocked by 
net enclosures placed there by farmers without formal rights to this activity. However, removal of 
net enclosures is unlikely to be a sufficient remedy. Accordingly, a range of pollution abatement 
instruments including tradable shrimp output quotas, tradable shrimp input quotas, shrimp output 
taxes, shrimp input taxes, tradable pollution quotas and pollution taxes were assessed against 
normative criteria proposed by the environmental economics literature. First-order assessment 
criteria were environmental effectiveness and administrative feasibility. Second-order criteria were 
static efficiency, cost-efficiency, dynamic concerns, and political acceptability. 
Although shrimps are considered to be the most profitable aquaculture option under 
optimal production conditions, farmers do have production substitution options using other 
aquaculture species. Accordingly, any quota systems (either input or output) would need to be 
designed to include all species, with either separate quotas for each species or composite quotas for 
species aggregates. The most promising of the quota systems is likely to be an individually 
transferable quota (ITQ) on the seed inputs for each species. This judgement is based on the 
limited number of seed suppliers which facilitates monitoring, and limited capacity within a 
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specific production system to replace seed with other inputs. However, this measure is challenged 
by administrative burdens. Recent literature in the field of community-based natural resource 
management suggests that these burdens could potentially be reduced by a co-management system.  
Co-management has already been tested in four communes in TGCH Lagoon but only in 
association with the opening of waterways. Consequently, this study proposes a re-structured co-
management in TGCH Lagoon that includes management of individually transferable seed quotas. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Overview 
The objective of this study is to investigate the Tam Giang Cau Hai (TGCH) 
shrimp supply chain in order to identify factors constraining the chain and to suggest 
ways of improving its performance. In the absence of previous studies and adequate 
information about the performance of the Lagoon’s shrimp supply chain, it was 
decided to conduct the investigation in two phases starting with an exploratory 
study of dyadic relationships within the chain. The findings of this first stage were 
intended to inform the research questions to be addressed in the second stage of 
the study.  
The first (exploratory) stage of the research was qualitative and drew on 
theories provided by supply chain and value chain literature. The findings showed 
clearly that improved shrimp supply chain outcomes were dependent on addressing 
the issue of pollution in the Lagoon. Pollution is an environmental risk that adversely 
affects production levels, resulting in contractual failures that undermine 
coordination between agents in the supply chain. In keeping with the problem-
focused (rather than technique-focused) philosophy of the study, the second stage 
of the investigation analysed the pollution problem using theories drawn from 
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environmental economics and natural resource management. In so doing, this study 
integrates the usually distinct bodies of literature dealing with supply chain 
management, environmental economics and natural resource management.     
This introductory chapter first presents information on the physical, biological 
and socio-economic characteristics of the lagoon. This is followed by brief 
descriptions of aquaculture in Vietnam and shrimp production in TGCH Lagoon. The 
research questions are then presented, followed by an overview of the research 
philosophy and methods used.  
1.2 Introduction to TGCH Lagoon 
1.2.1 Natural conditions 
TGCH Lagoon is a tropical wetland system with an area of 21,467ha and a 
coastal length of 70km. The lagoon lies between latitudes 16014' - 16042'N and 
longitudes 107022 - 107057E (Figure 1.1). It is the largest lagoon in Southeast Asia 
(Huong & Berkes, 2011).  
1.2.1.1 Climate  
According to Thung (2007), the Tam Giang-Cau Hai Lagoon is at the southern 
end of the northern Vietnam monsoon region. The climate is also influenced by 
proximity to Truong Son Mountain. Annual rainfall averages 2,744mm/year and this 
is distributed unevenly with three months of dry season and nine months of rainy 
season. Peak rainfall occurs in October and November when floods often occur, 
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causing negative effects on aquaculture production. Annually, there are 0 to 4 storms 
with wind velocity from 20 - 40m/s. The entire area around the lagoon is prone to 
annual floods and low lying areas are particularly vulnerable. Storms and floods 
cause serious risks associated with the second crop of aquaculture from August to 
October. In November 1999 a catastrophic flood breached of the Lagoon barrier to 
the sea, resulting in loss of property and life of over 300 people. The annual average 
temperature is about 25-260C and the temperature is often 36-370C in the summer 
(May - August). Drought can occur from June to August. 
 
Figure 1.1. Location of TGCH Lagoon, adapted from ICZM (2003) 
1.2.1.2 Hydrographic conditions 
Thung (2007) states that the TGCH Lagoon system is affected by both river 
and marine hydrography. Four rivers converge at the Lagoon: O Lau, Huong 
(including three sub-streams Bo, Ta Trach, Huu Trach), Nong, and Truoi. During the 
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dry season, salt water may intrude up to 30km.  There are two marine estuaries, 
Thuan An and Tu Hien.  In Thuan An, the tidal fluctuation is 0.35m to 0.5m and at Tu 
Hien it is 0.55m to 1.0m. Waves in winter are 0.25m to 3m in height from the 
northeast. In summer they are 0.25m to 1m high and predominantly from the east. 
1.2.1.3 Ecology 
The TGCH Lagoon has been classified by the Ramsar Convention as a natural 
wetland brackish coastal lagoon (Thung, 2007). According to this author, there are six 
sub-ecosystems. 
Estuarine sub-ecosystem: The Lagoon is directly affected by four river mouths 
which comprise the estuarine sub-ecosystem. This eco-system is characterised by 
nutrient enrichment, low salinity, submerged grasses and water fowl immigration. 
Water grass sub-ecosystem: Water grass grows around the Lagoon and 
concentrates at depths of 0.5m to 1.5m, often growing into a blanket. The stock of 
water grass in the Lagoon is estimated at about 190,000 metric tons. The sub-
ecosystem transforms organic and inorganic matters into available foods for other 
organisms. It also functions as a habitat of marine and fresh water migrant 
organisms and a source of fry (seed) for the whole Lagoon. 
Soft bottom sub-ecosystem: This is from 2m to 9m in depth. Because of the 
depth and salinity (sometimes reaching 30%), water grass cannot grow. The soft 
  
 
5 
bottom is a place where small molluscs, crustaceans, echinoderm, and polychaeta all 
thrive. Hence, bottom fish are attracted to this area.  
Tidal sub-ecosystem: This area is narrow, comprising sand flats and associated 
sand dunes lying between the Lagoon and the sea. This sub-ecosystem has less 
diversity than the other sub ecosystems but provides some protection from 
penetration of salinity into the lagoon. 
Agricultural sub-ecosystem: These land areas are adjacent to the river mouths, 
and have been reclaimed for growing rice (approximately 120,000 tons per year) and 
other crops.  
Mangrove sub-ecosystem: There is a small area of mangrove forest in the 
Lagoon, comprising Avicennia mariana, Rhizophora apiculata, and Bruguiera 
sexangula.  This provides a habitat for waterfowl plus protection of the shoreline.  
The water grass, soft bottom and estuarine sub-ecosystems represent the 
three main ecosystems of TGCH Lagoon (Thung, 2007). 
TGCH Lagoon has rich biodiversity. It is estimated that there are about 1000 
species including phytoplankton (287 species), fish (215 - 230 species), birds (73 
species), zooplankton (72 species), benthos (193 species), seaweed (46 species), 
higher plants (31 species), and water grasses (18 species) (Thung, 2007). According 
to Thung (2007), the high biodiversity is linked to the variation in salinity between 
the dry and rainy seasons.  
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 1.2.2 Socio–economic conditions of TGCH Lagoon 
TGCH Lagoon is not an administrative unit and hence the Statistical Office in 
TTH Province does not collect socio-economic information specific to the Lagoon. In 
this sub-section, the major source of information is a baseline survey of the 
Integrated Management of Tam Giang Cau Hai Lagoon Activities Project (IMOLA) 
conducted in 2006.  
There are about 300,000 inhabitants from 33 communes in 5 districts living in 
and around the Lagoon (IMOLA 2006). The incidence of poverty in these 
communities ranged from 55-70% in year 2000 (Phap, Mien & Thuan, 2002). This 
does not compare favourably with the national poverty rate in rural areas of 35.6% in 
that year (Phap et al., 2002).    
Of the 300,000 inhabitants, it is estimated that 100,000 people engage in 
aquaculture and capture fisheries as their main livelihood activity, and the remaining 
200,000 people participate in a range of related activities, including coastal 
agriculture and occasional or part-time aquaculture and capture fisheries (Tuyen, 
Armitage & Marschke, 2010). Complementary occupations include seasonal work, 
construction and trading. Households engaged in aquaculture as their main activity 
also undertake agriculture, livestock and capture fisheries. Farmers practicing 
agriculture as their main activity also raise livestock but undertake limited 
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aquaculture and capture fisheries. Fishermen are also involved in aquaculture and 
livestock but not in agriculture. 
According to the IMOLA (2006) survey conducted in 23 of the 33 communes, 
over 90% of households have electricity and access to fresh water. The number of 
the poor either without houses or living in temporary houses decreased from 18,675 
people in 2001 to 3,750 people in 2005.  
 In TGCH Lagoon, less than half (46.6%) of the population in 2005 had more 
than primary education and 2.6% of working age labourers were illiterate. Of the 
economically active population, 58.2% had never had skills training. Commune-level 
organisations associated with technical knowledge transfer and the provision of 
credit include the Farmer’s Union, Women’s Union, Youth Union and Veterans’ 
Union. 
1.3 Aquaculture development in Vietnam 
In 1986, Vietnam conducted a substantial economic transformation, namely 
Doi Moi. The core economic principles were the provision of a legal and institutional 
framework for - and encouragement of - the private sector, the replacement of 
administrative controls with economic incentives, and the promotion of agriculture 
through de-collectivisation and land reform (CIE, 1998; Kumssa, 1997). In addition, 
the development of economic sub-sectors in which Vietnam held competitive 
advantage was emphasised. The Vietnamese central government’s intention to 
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develop aquaculture to take advantage of its long coastline was recognised in 
several legal documents such as the Proceedings of the National Party Assembly in 
1998, decision 224/QD-TTg of the Prime Minister in 1999, and Resolution 09/NQ-CP 
of the central government in 2000.   
The development of sustainable commercial aquaculture became a priority of 
Vietnam. By 2003, 612,778ha of marine brackish water and 254,835ha of freshwater 
had been utilized for aquaculture, with shrimp culture occupying 580,464ha of the 
brackish area (Vietnam Ministry of Fisheries [MFI], 2008).  
The value of aquaculture within total Vietnamese GDP increased from 2.1% in 
1996 to 5.8% in 2005, whereas the contribution of capture fisheries to national GDP 
diminished from 5.0% to 4.0% in this period (General Statistical Office of Vietnam 
[GSO Vietnam], 2006). The export value of the fisheries sector increased from US$697 
million in 1996 to US$2,650 million in 2005 (Nguyen, 2007). The total area of 
aquaculture in Vietnam increased at an annual compound rate of 13.8% and the total 
volume of production increased 33.2% per annum from 1999 to 2005 (GSO Vietnam, 
2006). By 2006, aquaculture ranked as the third-most prominent economic sector 
after the oil and garment industries (GSO, 2006).  
1.4 Shrimp production in TGCH Lagoon 
In TTH province, there are two categories of aquaculture, including fresh water 
and brackish water aquaculture. All aquaculture in the TGCH Lagoon is of the 
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brackish type, and this TGCH aquaculture comprised about 70% of the total 
provincial aquaculture area in 2007 (TTH Statistical Office, 2008).  
In TGCH Lagoon, shrimp culture is the most important type of aquaculture. 
There are two kinds of shrimps grown in the Lagoon. Penaneus monodon, the main 
one, was introduced in the early 1990s, and Litopenaeus vanname, the secondary one, 
was introduced in 2004. 
 In TGCH Lagoon, the area used for shrimp production increased from just 
100ha in 1995 (Phap, 2002) to a peak of nearly 4000ha in 2004 (TTH Statistical 
Bureau, 2005). In 2002 the provincial TTH government set a target of 5,939ha by 
2010 (Decision 3170/QD-UB). 1.5 Research questions and justification 
1.5 Research questions and justification 
1.5.1 Research questions 
The following research questions were posed for the exploratory stage of this 
investigation: 
1. What is the current situation of the supply chain for shrimp produced from 
the TGCH Lagoon? 
2. What are the key constraints to improved chain performance? 
The results of the exploratory study are presented in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
They show clear evidence of systemic failure in the shrimp supply chain. This failure 
is attributed directly to declining and increasingly volatile yields caused by the 
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interrelated effects of water pollution and shrimp diseases. Further, this pollution 
reflects failure in current policies and institutions used to manage the shared water 
resources of TGCH Lagoon. Consequently, the second stage of this research relies 
largely on economic theory to understand the origins of the main water pollution 
problem affecting shrimp production in the Lagoon and to identify an effective 
policy response. The research questions for the second stage of the investigation 
were: 
3. What are the alternative policy options for dealing with pollution that 
harms shrimp production in the TGCH Lagoon? 
4. What is the most promising policy option to deal with this pollution?  
1.5.2 Justification of the research  
The justification of the research relates to the importance of shrimp culture to 
the economy of TTH Province, and to the inherent complexities and associated 
challenges of facilitating shrimp industry economic development while containing 
and then reducing environmental degradation. Although there have been several 
socio-economic studies of shrimp production in TGCH Lagoon, they have focused 
only on shrimp production at the farm level and none has provided a systematic 
view of shrimps as a resource-based agribusiness chain.  In addition, although water 
pollution has been recognised as a serious livelihood problem to local communities 
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taking into account both economic and environmental objectives, there is no 
contemporary study investigating policy options for managing that pollution.        
1.6 Research approach 
1.6.1 Epistemology and ontology 
Ontology and epistemology are regarded as a philosophical starting point for 
research, leading to the identification of appropriate methodologies and methods 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). According to Davidson and Tolich (2003, p24), ontology 
can be defined as “reality” or an inventory of the kinds of thing that do, or can, exist 
in the world. Epistemology is considered as the philosophical theory of knowledge, 
or in other words, the branch of philosophy that deals with how we know what we 
know. In research, ontology and epistemology provide guidelines for the researcher 
in identifying the path along which the research is to be constructed and conducted 
(Sarantatos, 2005). Ontology and epistemology are starting points in research design 
as they determine the research approach (Figure 1.2) 
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Figure 1.2. The research approach 
In this research, the reality (ontology) is the performance of shrimp business. In 
this process, business players undertake complex functions based on incomplete 
knowledge in a dynamic environment. They make decisions to maximise their 
personal utility within a bounded rationality and scarce resources. The performance 
of each business actor is influenced both by internal factors, which refer to 
personality, skills, perceptions and preferences, and by external factors which refer to 
many relationships between the actor and the business environment (law, regulation, 
policies, natural conditions, etc.). In this sense, research findings cannot be a one-
Ontology (reality) 
Epistemology (constructivist approach) 
Methodology/ Research paradigm (quantitative or qualitative) 
Research categories (descriptive, exploratory and explanatory) 
Data collection and analysis 
Data interpretation 
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size-fits-all explanation of reality, but only an “idiosyncratic search for temporary 
truth” (Burke, 1985 cited in Davidson & Tolich, 2003, p34). This is why the 
constructivist approach was applied in the epistemology of this research. The 
constructivist approach assumes that the reality is not directly knowable, individuals 
develop subjective meaning of their experiences – meanings directed toward certain 
objects or things (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Schwandt, 2007). These meanings are varied 
and multiple, leading the researcher to look for the complexity of  views rather than 
narrowing meanings into a few categories or ideas. As a consequence, the research is 
to rely as much as possible on the participants’ views of  the situation being studied 
1.6.2 Research methodology 
 There are two kinds of research methodologies based on qualitative and 
quantitative inquiry paradigms. According to Patton (2002. p69), all debates about 
application of these alternative approaches focus on the “relative value of two 
different and competing inquiry paradigms: 
- using quantitative and experimental methods to generate and test 
hypothetical-deductive generalisation, versus 
- using qualitative and naturalistic approaches to inductively and holistically 
understand human experience and construct meanings in context-specific settings.”   
 For different research purposes, each methodology has its own logic. In 
qualitative research, the inductive logic is employed to generate theory, whereas in 
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quantitative research, deductive logic is used to test theory. Accordingly, qualitative 
and quantitative research address different aspects of the same reality, and represent 
different intellectual frames of mind (Golicic et al., 2005).  
 In this study, a qualitative paradigm was employed to address the exploratory 
research questions seeking a better understanding of the TGCH shrimp supply chain 
and its performance. Case study was selected as the research strategy because it 
allows researchers to obtain holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events 
(Yin, 2003). The unit of analysis was defined as the shrimp industry based on 
production originating from the Lagoon. Primary data were gathered by interviewing 
industry participants, and some secondary data were located in government reports. 
Constructs used to guide the line of questioning and to analyse the data were drawn 
primarily from value chain and supply chain literature, especially the work of Mentzer 
et al. (2001), Collins et al. (2001) and Trkman and McCormack (2009), and from 
theories of industry development (Van de Ven & Garud, 1989). Methods used to 
conduct and analyse the case study are discussed more fully in Chapter 3. The 
findings of this exploratory research were consistent with secondary data showing 
the spread of shrimp diseases and declining area of shrimp production in TGCH 
Lagoon, and with theoretical arguments relating to changes in property rights to the 
Lagoon’s resources. 
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A different research strategy was adopted to address the policy questions 
posed in the second stage of the study because farmers and other agents in the 
TGCH shrimp supply chain had little or no experience with policy instruments to 
control water pollution. For this reason, a normative, analytical research strategy 
drawing on economic theory and information provided by key informants was used 
to explain the origins of the main pollution problem affecting shrimp production in 
the Lagoon and to identify an appropriate policy response. The theory was drawn 
from literature dealing with environmental economics and natural resource 
management. The normative research strategy and its supporting literature are 
described more fully in Chapter 4.  
1.7 Thesis structure 
This thesis comprises of seven chapters. Chapter 2 reviews literature about 
agricultural supply chain management. Chapter 3 describes the case study used in 
the exploratory investigation of the shrimp supply chain in TGCH Lagoon, analyses 
the case study data, demonstrates a clear link between the chain’s poor performance 
and water pollution created by the rapid expansion of intensive shrimp farming, and 
links these outcomes to recent changes in property rights to the Lagoon’s bed and 
water. Chapter 4 applies Gordon’s (1954) model of common property to analyse the 
main pollution problem affecting shrimp production in the Lagoon, and then draws 
on the environmental economics literature to construct a set of possible pollution 
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abatement instruments and normative criteria to assess these instruments. Chapter 5 
applies the assessment criteria and identifies an appropriate pollution abatement 
instrument to promote sustainable shrimp production in the Lagoon. Chapter 6 
considers the question of how best to implement the recommended pollution 
abatement instrument and explores the merits of co-management described in 
recent literature dealing with community-based natural resource management. 
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis with a summary of its main findings and 
recommendations for a sustainable shrimp supply chain at TGCH Lagoon.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORIES OF SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT 
 
2.1 Conceptualising an agricultural supply chain 
Supply chain management is a topic that has attracted the interest of many 
researchers and practitioners because market competition is no longer between 
individual firms but between supply chains (Trkman et al., 2007; Li et al., 2005).  Modi 
and Mabert (2007) argue that quality, costs and risks of a product or service are 
concerns not only of an individual firm but also of the network of firms that service it. 
Wathne and Heide (2004) contend that in order to understand performance of an 
individual firm, a larger network must be investigated.   
In the food sub-sector, due to increasing demand for food, scientific farming 
has become widespread and has been instrumental in the change from small family-
owned farms to larger, corporate farms. The modern farmer is an expert specialising 
in cultivation and animal breeding operations, thus transferring the functions of 
storing, processing and distribution of plants and animal products as well as the 
supply of input and production factors to organisations other than the farm. As a 
result, the traditional classification of activities into primary, secondary and tertiary 
sectors has given way to an analysis that focuses on the interlinked system of 
production, processing and commercialisation of farming originated products. 
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2.1.1 The supply chain and business system 
There are several definitions of supply chain ranging from simple to 
complicated. Christopher (1992) defined a supply chain as a network of organisations 
that are involved, through upstream and downstream linkages, in the different 
processes and activities that produce value in the form of products and services in 
the hand of final customers. La Londe and Masters (1994) considered a supply chain 
as a set of firms that pass materials forward. According to those authors, 
independent firms in the chain include raw material and component producers, 
product assemblers, wholesalers, and retail merchants. Lambert, Stock and Ellram 
(1998) emphasised collaboration among firms in their definition of a supply chain as 
an alignment of firms that bring products or services to market. Finally, supply chain 
is conceptualised as flows of products, services, finance and information from a 
source to a customer (Mentzer et al., 2001, pp1-26) and it is a dynamic process (Jain, 
Wadhwa and Deshmukh, 2009).    
This definition suggests that a supply chain includes not only the obvious 
agents like input suppliers, producers and distributors but also the firms that support 
these agents such as logistics companies, banks, market research firms and so on. 
Following this approach, Streeter, Sonka and Hudson (1991, p1465) define the 
agricultural supply chain as “a chain of interrelated activities including genetics and seed 
stock firms, input suppliers, agricultural producers, merchandisers, processors, retailers and 
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consumers supported by firms providing various services, financing, and research and 
development”. Surprisingly, none of these definitions mentions the role of public 
organisations that might have supporting functions e.g. the provision of training, 
audit and information services to other actors in the chain.  
The networking characteristic of a supply chain involves systematic 
relationships among its members. Webster (1992) argued that networks are 
characterised by complex and multifaceted organisational structures reflecting 
multiple strategic alliances. Webster (1992) also argued that the fundamental point 
in network organisation is the confederation in which key functions are oriented by a 
chain leader. Key functions in this context include developing and managing the 
alliances, coordinating financial resources and technology, defining and managing 
core competence and strategy, developing customer relationships, and managing 
information resources.        
In order to investigate the performance of a supply chain, it is necessary to 
understand systematic relationships that exist not only among firms within the 
supply chain but also the external environment because supply chains do not 
operate in a vacuum. According to Van de Ven and Garud (1989), an industry 
consists of three sub-systems: instrumental, institutional and resource procurement. 
The instrumental sub-system includes firms involved in the production of goods with 
similar consumption attributes. The resource procurement sub-system of the 
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industry services the instrumental activities. The institutional sub-system is 
concerned with two main aspects: governance and legitimisation. It aims to establish 
a political and institutional environment favourable to the industry and the industry’s 
right to use resources.  
Table 2.1: An agribusiness system for shrimp product 
Agribusiness sub-systems 
Institutional Instrumental Resource procurement 
Governance structure 
 
Legitimation and support 
 
Policy, rules, regulations 
and standards 
Input providers (seed, feed…) 
 
Shrimp farmers 
 
Intermediaries (wholesalers) 
 
Processors 
 
Retailers 
Research and 
development 
 
Credit provider 
 
Infrastructure 
 
Extension network 
Source: Adapted from Streeter et al. (1991) and Van de Ven and Garud (1989). 
In this study, the subject is the supply chain for shrimp products in TGCH 
Lagoon. The concept of a business system, as developed by Van de Ven and Garud 
(1989) and Streeter et al. (1991) (Table 2.1) is used to examine the performance of 
shrimp supply chains in TGCH Lagoon. 
2.1.2 Supply chain management  
Supply chains exist in all distributional channels whether their relationships 
are managed or not (Mentzer et al., 2001, p1-26). However, whether the performance 
of supply chains is effective or not depends on how they are managed. The term 
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‘supply chain management’, was first used in 1982 to describe the range of activities 
coordinated by an organisation to procure and manage supplies (Oliver & Weber, 
1982). This topic gained popularity among researchers and practitioners from the 
mid 1990s (Dunne, 2001) and supply chain management practices are now widely 
recognised in the food-business sector (Collins, Dunne & Murray, 2001). According 
to Mentzer (2001), supply chain management  can be viewed as an operational term, 
a management process, and as a business philosophy.  
Within the operational view, supply chain management was referred to as 
‘logistics’ during the 1950s (Hugos, 2003). Logistics referred to the process in which 
products and services moved from a source to a destination. There was no clear 
demarcation between the terms ‘logistics’ and ‘supply chain management’ at that 
time (Lambert & Cooper, 2000). Today, logistics management is defined as “that part 
of supply chain management  that plans, implements, and controls the efficient, effective 
forward and reverse flow and storage of goods, services and related information between the 
point of origin and the point of consumption in order to meet customers’ requirements” 
(Council of Logistics Management cited in Vitasek, 2003, p74).  
Cooper, Lambert and Pagh (1997) re-conceptualise the understanding of 
supply chain management from integrating logistics across the supply chain to the 
process of integrating and managing business across the supply chain. With regard 
to the management process, supply chain management can be defined as “the 
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systematic, strategic coordination of the traditional business functions and the tactics across 
these business functions within a particular company and across businesses within the supply 
chain, for the purpose of improving the long-term performance of the individual companies 
and the supply chain as a whole” (Mentzer et al., 2001). The management process 
across the supply chain involves customer relationship management, customer 
service management, demand management, order fulfilment, manufacturing 
management, procurement, and product development and commercialisation 
(Lambert & Cooper, 2000, p67). Simchi-Levi, D., Kaminsky and Simchi-Levi, E., (1999) 
define supply chain management as the integration of key business processes 
among a network of interdependent business actors in order to improve the flow of 
goods, services, and information from original suppliers to final customers, with the 
objectives of reducing system-wide costs while maintaining required service levels. 
Lastly, the philosophical view of supply chain management emphasises 
relationships between actors in a supply chain (Ellram & Cooper, 1990; Greene, 1991; 
Cooper, Ellram, Gardner & Hanks, 1997). A business philosophy is an ideal or policy 
of a particular business actor (Backsdale & Darden, 1971; McNamara, 1972). From 
this perspective, a supply chain is considered an entity in which business actors have 
a unified ideal or policy in supplying products and services to the final consumer. 
The philosophy of supply chain management requires synchronisation and 
convergence between business players in terms of operational and strategic 
capabilities into a unified system (Ross, 1998). The unified system is to achieve 
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customer satisfaction. Hines (2004, p76) commented that “Supply chain strategies 
require a total systems view of the linkages in the chain that work together efficiently to 
create customer satisfaction at the end point of delivery to the consumers”.     
Supply chain management brings about many benefits to business actors, not 
only reducing operational costs but also creating customer value (Morash & Clinton, 
1998; Normam & Ramirez, 2000; Wysocki, 2000; Dunne, 2001; Mentzer et al., 2001; 
Chopra & Meindl, 2004); improving competitiveness and profitability, and reducing 
time and cost (Schotzko & Hinson, 2000); enhancing organisational productivity and 
profitability (Gunasekaran & Chung, 2004); and improving cooperation among 
business actors within the supply chain by avoiding conflicts, improving logistics and 
coordination of production inventory, and achieving better flow of information 
(Hugos, 2003; Roekel, Kopichi, Broekmans & Boselie, 2002). With regard to the food 
supply chain, supply chain management is extremely important owing to the 
scattered distribution of producers, the perishability of agricultural products, and 
strong competition. 
2.2 Factors contributing to the success of supply chain management  
Increasing competition in the global market means that firms must not only 
be successful in their own operations but must also become embedded within a 
highly responsive supply chain (Su & Yang, 2010). Supply chain management plays a 
key role in establishing such supply chains. It is thus that supply chain management 
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is a growing area of interest amongst researchers and practitioners from varied 
disciplines (Arshinder, Kanda & Deshmukh, 2008).  
Lambert and Cooper (2000, p69) worked out a conceptual framework of 
supply chain management as a combination of three elements including: the supply 
chain network structure, the supply chain business processes, and the supply chain 
management components. The supply chain network structure includes business 
actors and the links between these actors. Business processes refer to the activities 
that produce a specific output of value to the customer. The management 
components are the managerial variables by which the business processes are 
integrated and managed across the supply chain. Lambert and Cooper (2000, p81) 
argue that successful supply chain management requires integrating business 
processes with key members of the supply chain. Collins et al. (2001) identify the 
following six interlinked factors contributing to the success of a SCM: 
- customer focus; 
- creating and sharing value; 
- getting the product right; 
- having an effective information and communication strategy; 
- ensuring effective logistics along the chain; and 
- building effective relationships. 
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2.2.1 Customer focus 
Market orientation is one component in the culture of a learning organisation 
(Slater & Narver, 1995) and satisfying customer needs is the central purpose of any 
business (Doyle, 1994). Customer needs are satisfied with customer value created by 
firms. Firms within a supply chain must all agree to prioritize customer service 
(Lambert et al., 1998; La Londe & Master, 1994; Ross, 1998) because understanding 
the customer’s situation and responding effectively to differing needs through 
supply chain management is a source of superior customer value creation (Juttner, 
Christopher & Baker, 2007.) 
According to Kordupleski, Rust and Zahorik (1993) and Wood (2003), the first 
condition for customer focus is to address precisely customers’ needs based on 
understanding customers’ values and requirements. Because the nature of 
customers’ needs is dynamic as a part of business uncertainty, business actors need 
to grasp those changes in customers’ needs and revise their supply chain strategies 
timely and accordingly (Takeuchi & Quelch, 1983). More specifically, the reasons of 
firms’ successes in their competition are worked out as: (i) to respond quickly to 
customers’ demand with new ideas and technologies; (ii) to produce products that 
meet or exceed customers’ requirements; and (iii) anticipate and respond to dynamic 
customers’ needs (Stalk, Evans & Schulman, 1992). It is therefore, important for 
supply chain members to understand customers’ needs in order to develop supply 
  
 
26 
chain management strategies and business plans to improve competitiveness of the 
whole supply chain. Consumers have not only demands on specific foods but also 
concerns about several related issues such as food safety, environmental and social 
responsibility, and animal welfare (Roekel et al., 2002, Pyke & Tang, 2010). Customer 
preferences are complicated and continuously evolving. Hence, business players in 
food supply chain need to pay much attention in understanding customers’ needs 
and satisfying them.  
In order to carry out customer focus effectively, building relationships with 
customers through improving customer service and customer care is a priority to 
business players (Stewart, 1994). The vehicles for creating good perceptions of 
customers on products/services are to improve products/services quality and 
customer services (Carlson, Gilmore and Maclaran, 1998). Improved quality of 
products/services and improved customer services are necessary conditions for 
business players to get high price and loyalty of customers as they are important 
factor for satisfying customers in long-term.        
2.2.2 Creating and sharing value 
Generally, value is defined as “a quantitative measure of utility” (Clark, 1981, 
p459). Regarding the performance of individual business, value is defined as “the 
amount buyers are willing to pay for what a firm provides them” (Porter, 1985, p38). With 
a view on the whole business chain, Cox (1999) considered a value chain in terms of 
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the revenue flow of any product and service from the end consumer. It means that a 
value chain is another side of a supply chain. Or in other words, adding value along 
the chain is an inherent characteristic of a supply chain.  
With the view of value chain, business actors at any stage in a chain can add 
value to the products/services through the functions they carry out (Collins et al., 
2002; Webster, 2001). In a food supply chain, there are many kinds of adding value 
activities including cleaning and cooling, packaging, processing, distributing, 
cooking, combining, churning, culturing, grinding, hulling, extracting, drying, 
smoking, labelling, or packaging (Richard & Wechsler, 1996). These value adding 
activities can account for 85% of the final retail cost in the food sub-sector (Webster, 
2001).  
For business players in the food sub-sector, there are two kinds of strategies 
of adding value, namely captured-value and created-value (Born & Bachmann, 2006). 
The difference between these two strategies relies on the way that business players 
derive benefit from their value adding activities. The captured-value strategy argues 
that business players can get benefits through participating directly in producing 
food products, marketing to consumers, and joining producers’ co-operatives for 
processing their products at scale. The created-value strategy emphasises the ability 
of business actors to get profits through unique or different characteristics of their 
products. According to this strategy, benefits can be realised through organic 
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certification, a brand image, identification with a specific geographic region and/or 
producer, identity preservation, and ethical or environmental stewardship. 
Each strategy has its own strengths and weaknesses. The captured-value 
strategy is a conventional way so the risk associated with investment might be low. 
However, competition in commodity markets is often high. Moreover, the latent risk 
when customers’ preferences turn to other products should be considered. 
Conversely, the created-value strategy exposes business players to higher risks 
because they do a new thing compared with other ones, meanwhile business players 
might get higher profits and little competition. In the food sub-sector, practical 
considerations of business players according to this strategy are about food safety, 
labelling and other regulations, as well as coping with liability issues and insurance 
(Born & Bachmann, 2006). Finally, there are many benefits and costs associated with 
value adding activities. Therefore, the decision of business players on whether to 
take adding value activities or not depends on the estimated costs and benefits of 
these activities.   
2.2.3 Getting the product right 
Sub-section 2.2.1 argues that understanding customers’ values and 
requirements is the key factor for success of a supply chain. To satisfy customers’ 
needs, the follow-up thing is to provide right products/services. So what are right 
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products/services? The answer for this question must be based on how the 
customers’ need is perceived by business players.      
In general, customers’ needs can be categorised in two following groups: 
individual satisfaction and societal benefits (Hudson, 1990). Individual satisfaction is 
achieved thanks to characteristics of products/services that satisfy private needs of 
customers. Those attributes of products/services might be convenience, variety, 
stable prices, product quality, and nutrition and food safety. Meanwhile, societal 
benefits are derived from satisfying customers’ concerns about societal issues. Those 
issues might be human welfare, environmental security, food safety, economic 
stability, investment opportunities and ethical business conduct. 
Customer needs evolve continuously and become more and more 
complicated. Individual business players as well as the whole supply chain need to be 
able to adapt accordingly to those changes. Collins et al. (2001) pointed out that to 
be capable of adapting to change, business players need to understand (i) what their 
products/services are, and how those products/services are transformed, (ii) what 
value is added along the supply chain, (iii) the market specification of the 
products/services, and (iv) the customers’ specifications. It’s the reason why the 
quality management system becomes necessary within individual firms as well as the 
whole supply chain in order to provide the right products/services, (Collins et al., 
2001). 
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Individual and societal benefits are clear in the food sub-sector. For 
identifying right products, several standards relate to food safety and responsible 
production. Those standards include Good Agricultural Practice (GAP), Total Quality 
Management (TQM), and Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) 
(Roekel et al., 2002). The cost of meeting those standards is significant to small 
producers in developing countries. When many firms enter to the market and they 
set up quality criteria in a disorderly manner, it might undermine brand name of the 
domestic industry. In order to solve this problem, small producers often build up 
horizontal coordination. The horizontal coordination is helpful to maintain industry 
criteria for establishing or keeping reputation of the domestic industry in global 
market.    
2.2.4 Having an effective information and communication strategy 
According to Porter and Millar (1985, p152) every organisational activity 
includes both physical and information components. The physical task is to produce 
product and the information task is to capture, process and exchange information to 
support the production. Regarding customer orientation in business, the timely 
response of firms to customers’ needs is obviously an important factor and those 
responses cannot be done without effective information sharing among business 
players (Mason-Jones & Towill, 1997). Several authors stress the significance of 
mutual information exchanged among members in a supply chain (Ellram & Cooper, 
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1990; Cooper, Ellram, Gardner & Hanks, 1997; Cooper et al., 1997; Zhao, Xie & Zhang, 
2002; Zhou & Benton, 2007). 
One important aspect of information and communication strategy within a 
supply chain is the quality of exchanged information. Petersen (1999) argues that 
information quality is measured by the degree to which the information exchanged 
between organisations meets the needs of the organisations. Several researchers 
have identified important characteristics of information quality. These characteristics 
are content, accuracy, recency, and frequency according to Neumman and Segev 
(1979); accuracy, frequency, credibility, and availability of forecast according to 
McCormack (1998); and currency, accuracy, and completeness according to Petersen 
(1999).   
There is a wide range of information that can be exposed to other members in 
a supply chain including inventory levels, market predictions, sale promotion 
strategies, and marketing strategies (Global Logistics Research Team, 1995). 
Moreover, Shepherd (1997) argued that business actors should exchange both 
current and historical information because current information is for meeting the 
immediate requirements of producers and marketers and historical information is for 
their long-term planning. 
The benefits of mutual sharing information are clear, especially to planning 
and monitoring efforts of business players. Uncertainty is an inherent attribute to any 
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business and it imposes high transaction costs on business players and hinders their 
performance in satisfying customers’ needs. Specifically, Shepherd (1997) stated that 
lack of information or misleading information regarding consumer requirements 
might bring about problems in the provision of infrastructure, transport, handling 
facilities, and marketing management, as well as the necessary planning to put these 
in place. In the presence of uncertainty, mutual sharing of information among supply 
chain members helps to reduce uncertainties and, as a consequence, reduces 
transaction costs and enhances business performance (Shepherd, 1997; Schotzko & 
Hinson, 2000; Zhao et al., 2002). 
Despite those benefits, it is not easy to achieve effective information sharing 
among chain members as business actors tend to withhold information to take 
advantages of information asymmetry (Akerlof, 1970; Stiglitz, 1975; Schotzko & 
Hinson, 2000; Collins et al., 2001; Sahay, 2003). This is why the involvement of the 
public sector in providing impartial and accurate market information is often 
considered necessary (Shepherd, 1997).    
2.2.5 Ensuring effective logistics along the chain 
One important function of supply chain management is to provide logistics 
management effectively (Zuckerman, 2002). The purpose of logistics management is 
for effective and efficient movement and storage of products along the chain from 
production to final consumers (Fisher, 1997; Ross, 1998; Collins et al., 2002; Chopra & 
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Meindl, 2004). Logistics management has a significant role in the success of a supply 
chain because good logistics management brings about many benefits that are not 
only from satisfaction of customers’ needs but also reduction of transaction costs 
(Collins et al., 2002).   
Logistics management consists of many activities as Coyle, Bardi and Langley 
(2003) pointed out. These activities include forecasting, order management, 
production and inventory planning, procurement, warehousing, material handling 
and packaging, and transport. Furthermore, paralleling with the movement of 
products along the supply chain, logistics management must be integrated with 
exchanging information flow along the chain (Hugos, 2003). According to Cooper et 
al. (1997), a successful supply chain needs an integrated process from sourcing, 
manufacturing and distributing along the chain.     
In the food sub-sector, business is characterised by the perishable nature of 
most products, dynamic consumer preferences, seasonality and the gap between 
time of planning production and time of supply. Therefore, the role of logistics 
management in the food sub-sector is even more significant than in other sectors 
(Schotzko & Hinson, 2000). In developing economies that lack modern facilities and 
good infrastructure, providing high quality and safe food products to final 
consumers can pose real challenges to logistics managers (Roekel et al., 2002). Given 
such poor logistical conditions, supply chain management in general, and the 
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function of mutual information sharing in particular, must be enhanced to reduce 
uncertainties and risks associated with business.       
2.2.6 Building effective relationships  
Supply chain management is essentially made up of a set of partnerships. 
Partnership is defined as the bond connecting supply chain members (Dunne, 2001) 
or as the collaborative long-term relationship between a buyer and a seller 
(Gunasekaran, 2004). Both of these definitions of partnership recognise 
interdependence and cooperation among business actors in a supply chain. It has 
been shown that dependence, commitment, trust, and communication are related to 
the economic success of buyer–seller relations and inter-firm cooperation (Hoffman 
& Mehra, 2000; Kingshott, 2006). Several authors emphasise that an effective supply 
chain management needs to build, maintain, and enhance long-term relationships 
(Cooper et al., 1997; Lambert & Cooper, 2000; Stanko et al., 2007).    
A business agent may coordinate both horizontally and vertically when 
building effective relationships with other agents. Coordination can be defined as 
effort or measures designed to make players within a market system act in a 
common or complementary way or toward a common goal (Poulton et al., 2004). 
Vertical coordination refers to contractual arrangements between firms at different 
stages of the supply chain. The intensity of vertical coordination achieved by these 
arrangements varies between the two extremes of spot market exchange (no 
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coordination) and vertical integration into a single firm (Swimnen, 2005).  Horizontal 
coordination refers to contractual arrangements between firms at the same stage of 
the supply chain.  
There are several drivers that encourage business agents to coordinate 
vertically.  Williamson (1971) attributes vertical coordination largely to the hold-up 
problem. This problem arises when value-adding requires investment in highly 
specific assets, and returns from this investment are uncertain owing to bounded 
rationality and opportunism. Since the asset has little value in other uses, firms in the 
supply chain could extract quasi-rents from the investor by threatening to withhold 
their products or services. Under these conditions, the parties have an incentive to 
establish relationships that will reduce the investor’s risk and so facilitate value-
adding to their mutual benefit. Williamson (1971) concludes that the advantages of 
integration are not that technological (flow process) economies are unavailable to 
non-coordinated firms, but rather that vertical coordination harmonizes interests and 
makes decision-making more efficient.  
Poulton and Lyne (2009) identify the key drivers of horizontal coordination as 
size economies, finance and bargaining power. Small farmers, for example, may pool 
their produce in order to reduce unit processing, marketing, compliance and 
transaction costs, to share the costs of lumpy assets, and to negotiate and enforce 
favourable contractual terms. If the farmers surrender decision-making power to a 
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centralised management team as in a marketing cooperative, the outcome is 
referred to as horizontal integration, analogous to vertical integration.  
Partnerships among supply chain members are therefore viewed as critical for 
both short and long-term performance of the chain, especially when business players 
are small and lack market power, logistical facilities and access to an impartial legal 
system. As Morgan and Hunt (1999) contend, many small firms find that entering 
partnerships is a good way to increase their joint competitiveness.   
Despite these benefits, it is not easy for business player to establish, maintain 
and develop partnerships owing to divergent views and lack of trust among supply 
chain members (Lambert & Cooper, 2000; Roekel et al., 2002); incomplete 
information about when and with whom to establish partnerships; attempting to 
implement partnerships that are over-reliant on technology (Barrat, 2004); and 
culture-related reasons (Spekman & Carraway, 2006). Partnership in the whole 
supply chain is even more difficult than dyadic partnership as it requires high levels 
of understanding beyond the firms directly involved (Barrat, 2004); open 
communication; high levels of trust (Roekel et al., 2002; Schotzko & Hinson, 2000); 
interdependence (Roekel et al., 2002); and the development of mutual benefits 
among supply chain collaborators (Roekel et al., 2002; Aghazadeh, 2004); common 
vision of future benefit, and common norm and value (Spekman & Carraway, 2006). 
Several authors stress that building partnerships is not only the key factor but also is 
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the most difficult element in successful supply chain management (Barrat, 2004; 
Aghazadeh, 2004; Collins et al., 2002; Schotzko & Hinson, 2000).       
2.3 Uncertainty as a threat to the supply chain 
The performance of a supply chain is affected by uncertainty. Uncertainty is 
defined as a situation in which there is not enough information (Rowe, 1977), 
knowledge or understanding to enable decision makers to identify all possible 
outcomes (Ritchie & Marshall, 1993), and their consequences or likelihood of 
occurrence (MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1986). Coordination in a supply chain implies 
dependency among firms. As a consequence, individual firms are exposed to risks 
facing other firms (Hallikas et al., 2004).  
There is a strong and negative relationship between the level of uncertainty 
and performance of a supply chain. Uncertainty might lead to inferior customer 
services, excess inventory, waste, excess business capacity, and - as a result - higher 
cost of supply and less customer value (Fisher, Hammond, Obermeyer & Raman, 
1994; McGuffog & Wadsley, 1999, Kleindorfer et al., 2003).  
To describe the general nature of uncertainty faced by a firm, Koopmans 
(1957, pp162-163) made a distinction between primary uncertainty, which is state-
contingent, and secondary uncertainty which arises “from lack of communication 
that is from one decision maker having no way of finding out the concurrent 
decision and plans made by another”. Williamson (1996, p60) emphasised the role of 
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behavioural uncertainty, which arises from opportunism - for example strategic 
nondisclosure, disguise, or distortion of information. Davis (1993) grouped supply 
chain uncertainties according to their sources; supplier uncertainty relates to on-time 
performance, average lateness and degree of consistency; manufacturing uncertainty 
to process performance, machine breakdown, etc; and customer or demand 
uncertainty to failure in forecasting, side-selling, etc. Tang (2006) refers to external 
uncertainties in customer demand, supply and costs as operational uncertainties and 
distinguishes these from disruptions caused by natural and man-made disasters. 
Ritchie and Brindley (2007) categorised the turbulence caused by a combination of 
environment and industry characteristics as strategic risk. 
Trkman and McCormack (2009) proposed the constructs of endogenous and 
exogenous risk. Endogenous risk arises inside the supply chain and can lead to 
changing relationships between the focal firm and suppliers, the most notable kinds 
are market and technology turbulence. Exogenous risk arises outside the supply 
chain. This construct can be further divided into continuous risks (e.g. changes in the 
rate of inflation) and discrete risks (e.g. natural disaster, disease and war). Trkman 
and McCormack (2009) argued that endogenous risk could be addressed by a proper 
and proactive relationship with a supplier (e.g. enhancing information and risk 
sharing). Exogenous risk is generally much more difficult to manage as it is 
characterised by unplanned and unanticipated events.  
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Uncertainty has been generally viewed as a driver of vertical coordination 
between firms (Anderson & Coughlan, 1987; Stern & El-Ansary, 1992). However, 
Williamson (1996) emphasises the role of behavioural risk rather than exogenous 
risk. Trkman and McCormack (2009) argue that uncertainty does not necessarily 
encourage coordination. On the contrary, very high levels of systemic risk (i.e. risk 
affecting some agents creates risk for other agents in the chain) or covariant yield 
risk (i.e. risk that simultaneously affect the vast majority of producers) will tend to 
inhibit vertical coordination as there is little point in buyers contracting with 
suppliers who cannot deliver the agreed quantities and quality. This situation is 
particularly relevant to TGCH Lagoon where yields on small shrimp farms are 
affected by the same environmental conditions.  
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CHAPTER 3 
PERFORMANCE OF THE TGCH SHRIMP SUPPLY CHAIN 
 
3.1 Introduction and methods 
This chapter reports the results of an exploratory investigation of the supply 
chain for shrimps produced in the TGCH Lagoon. The supply chain was investigated 
within a qualitative and case study framework owing to the exploratory nature of the 
investigation and lack of prior information about the structure of the chain and its 
performance. The selected methodology is relevant to this study. Patton (2002, p69)  
argued that qualitative and naturalistic approaches are advantageous to inductively 
and holistically understand human experience, and to construct meanings in context-
specific settings. According to Yin (2003, pp1-9), the distinctive advantage of the 
case study approach is to allow researchers to identify holistic and meaningful 
characteristics of real-life events, such as individual life cycles, organisational and 
managerial processes, and industrial development.  Eisenhardt (1989) contended 
that theory building from case studies is particular appropriate when little is known 
about a phenomenon.  This fits well within the frame of this study, given the lack of 
prior knowledge relating to the supply chain.  
Business agents involved in the TGCH Lagoon shrimp supply chain were 
purposively selected for interviews about the shrimp supply chain and its evolution. 
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Given that the aim was to elicit information free of any predetermined perspective, 
data were gathered in semi-structured interviews using open-ended questions, with 
the content shaped by what the respondents told the researcher (Opie, 2003, p241).    
Various units of analysis have been proposed to study organisation 
economics (Williamson, 1996, p234). These units of analysis include decision premise 
(Simon, 1957, ppxxx-xxxii), ownership (Demsetz, 1967; Alchian & Demsetz 1973), 
industry (Bain, 1956; Scherer, 1970), individuals (Jensen, 1983), and transactions 
(Commons, 1934). According to Commons (1934, p4), transactions contain the three 
principles of conflict, order and mutuality. Commons’ three principles prefigured 
governance as the means by which to infuse order, to mitigate conflict and to realise 
mutual benefit. To study supply chain performance, the chain governance is the core 
issue. Several authors used dyadic transactions to investigate chain governance (Key 
& Runsten, 1999; Gereffi, Humphrey & Sturgeon, 2005; Beugelsdijk, Koen & 
Noorderhaven, 2009). In this study, dyadic transactions were treated as embedded 
units of analysis within the TGCH shrimp supply chain. Transactions are studied from 
different perspectives including transaction costs (Coase, 1937, Williamson, 1985), 
resource dependency (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and contract theory (Macneil, 1978).      
 The interviewed parties included farmers, shrimp collectors, and a processing 
and exporting enterprise (Table 3.1). Appendix 3.1 presents detailed information 
about the parties interviewed.   
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Table 3.1: Respondent interviewed and criteria for their selection 
Supply chain agents Number of respondents Criteria for selection 
Farmers 10 
Reflecting different levels of production scale: 
- Medium and large scale production : 8 
farmers (3 farmers having semi-intensive 
culture, 4 farmers having improve-extensive 
culture)  
- Small scale production: 3 farmers (1 farmer 
having improved-extensive culture, 2 farmers 
having extensive culture) 
Wholesalers 9 
Reflecting different business capacity  
- Large wholesalers: 5 respondents 
- Small independent wholesalers1: 2 
respondents 
- Small agents of large wholesalers2: 2 
respondents  
Processing-exporting 
company 
1 
 
Retailers 3 
Reflecting diversified domestic demand in 
different markets 
 
  Due to the existence of numerous small-scale shrimp farmers in TGCH 
Lagoon, a large collecting network has been established. Small wholesalers procure 
shrimps from farmers and sell to larger wholesalers both inside and outside TTH 
Province, and to retailers including hawkers in open-air markets, restaurants and 
hotels. From wholesalers, shrimps are sold to a number of processing-exporting 
                                               
1 Independent wholesalers are small middlemen who buy shrimp from farmers and sell to large scale 
wholesalers and/or retailers. 
2 Small agents of large wholesalers are small middlemen who buy shrimp from farmers and sell to 
their wholesalers only.  
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enterprises. However, only one of these processing- exporting enterprises is located 
within TTH Province.   
Farmers, wholesalers, and retailers were purposively selected to represent 
different business scales of respondents. It was consistent with the strategy of 
information-oriented selection developed by Flyvbjerg (2006) to maximise the utility 
of information from small and single cases. The vice-director of the Provincial 
Extension Centre recommended  certain farmers and two large scale wholesalers for 
interview. These large-scale wholesalers and interviewed farmers helped the author 
to identify other wholesalers and retailers.  
Interviews were conducted in April and May 2009.  For farmers, interviews 
took place on their farms. All other  interviews were conducted at the respondents’ 
places of business. Some of interviews were recorded if the respondents gave 
consent for this to occur. Notes were taken if  the respondents did not give consent 
for the interview to be recorded. 
Human ethics approval was given by the supervisor under delegated authority 
relating to situations where all questions are of a non-personal nature, and relating 
to matters within the professional competence of the interviewees.  
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In order to investigate the current situation of the supply chain for shrimp 
produced from the TGCH Lagoon, common guiding interview themes were applied 
in interviews with all actors in the supply chains (Appendix 3.2): 
- The development process of their businesses (how they started their businesses, 
how their businesses evolved and the reasons);  
- Their current functions in the shrimp supply chain (what function they performed, 
advantages and disadvantages of performing those functions);  
- The current situation of their business (availability of production factors, cost of 
production, revenue);  
- Accessibility to inputs (what inputs they need, where and how they buy inputs, 
how the price is established, how payment is made, how quality is maintained);  
- Relationships with input providers (the form of contracts, how often they are in 
contact with input providers, what and how information is exchanged between them 
and input providers, how they share risks, how they settle conflicts);  
- Accessibility to customers (what products they sell, where and how they sell 
products, how the price is established, how the payment is made, how quality is 
maintained); and 
- Relationships with buyers (the form of contracts, how often they are in contact 
with buyers, what and how information is exchanged between them and buyers, how 
they share risks, how they settle conflicts).  
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The development of these common guiding themes relied on an assumption 
that the current situation of the shrimp supply chain was an evolutionary outcome of  
business relationships. The evolutionary processes can be categorised into  two 
groups, namely competition and cooperation. The theoretical basis to examine 
competition behaviour included the strategic-based approach (Porter, 1980) and 
resource-based approach (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Cooperation behaviour was 
examined using  supply chain management theories (Mentzer et al, 2001, Collins et al, 
2001).  
The interviews undertaken in this field study relied on the memories of the 
actors. Interviewees had clear recollection about the major events that happened to 
their businesses, but were less clear about the details. The author took notes on 
changes of business behaviours of all interviewed actors. The changes of business 
behaviours informed the current situation of the supply chain. The current situation 
of shrimp supply chain was compared with principles of a successful supply chain 
(see Chapter 2) to find out failures in the shrimp supply chain. Furthermore, these 
failures were pooled together to find out their fundamental cause. In interview, 
insights on the fundamental problem of shrimp supply chain failures emerged 
obviously and consistently.     
In addition, key informant interviews were conducted with representatives of 
government organisations (Appendix 3.3). These informants provided insights about 
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aspects of shrimp production and marketing under their management, including 
information about policies and views on the institutional sub-system and also 
triangulated opinions of business players about the development of the shrimp 
supply chain in TGCH Lagoon. A checklist was made for each key informant reflecting 
issues raised in earlier interviews with supply chain agents and focusing on how their 
organisation provide help to shrimp business.    
In order to increase reliability of the research, related reports and documents 
issued by government organisations, NGOs, and research publications from 
academic institutions were collected. These materials were used to build up 
preliminary knowledge on the research issues before conducting interviews and to 
triangulate information gained through interviews.  
3.2 Performance of the shrimp supply chain in TGCH Lagoon 
3.2.1 An overview of the shrimp business system in TGCH Lagoon 
The performance of the shrimp supply chain in TGCH Lagoon is viewed within 
the framework of a broad business system which contains interacting sub-systems. 
These sub-systems include the instrumental (i.e. shrimp supply chain actors), 
procurement and institutional sub-systems. The business process along the supply 
chain is supported by both institutional and resource procurement sub-systems (Van 
de Ven & Garud, 1989).  
  
 
47 
The most important support from the resource procurement sub-system is 
the provision of credit and the dissemination of technical knowledge. According to 
Tinh (2005) and Hoa (2010), the incidence of shrimp farmers in TGCH Lagoon who 
have borrowed money to finance their production was 65% and 78% respectively. 
Interviewed farmers pointed out high investment in shrimp culture (especially initial 
investment in pond building) as the reason that most of them had to borrow money. 
The most important credit source for shrimp farmers was the Vietnam Bank of 
Agriculture and Rural Development (VBARD) in TTH Province. Interviewed farmers 
claimed that many shrimp farmers used their Red Book (i.e. certificate of private 
property rights) as collateral to access this formal credit before 2004. Due to losses 
of shrimp crop since 2004 which resulted in high rate of loan default, an increasing 
number of farmers had resorted to informal sources of credit.  
Dissemination of knowledge was carried out through a system of state-run 
and subsidised extension services from provincial to communal level. However, 
according to PECAAF (2008a), the technical support for aquaculture of this extension 
system did not meet the actual needs of farmers in term of both quantity (i.e. 
number of extension workers) and quality of provided services.  
The institutional sub-system provided indirect support to the supply chain 
through governance and legitimisation (Van de Ven & Garud, 1989). In the case of 
shrimp business in TGCH Lagoon, the sub-sector was dominated by government 
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agencies. Before 2008, the Department of Fisheries (DFI) had been responsible for 
governance of shrimp culture in the lagoon. In 2008, this department was merged 
with the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (DARD). At the time of 
data collection in 2009, government sub-agencies within DARD with responsibilities 
for aquaculture included the Office of Aquaculture, the Office of Rural Development 
and Quality Management for Agricultural Products, the Office of Veterinary Services, 
and the Office of Extension Services. Among these, the Office of Aquaculture leads 
the design of development policy for the whole sub-sector (Decision 1964/QD-
UBND in 2008 of TTH PCP). The Office of Rural Development and Quality 
Management for Agricultural Products was newly established and its operations were 
still limited (Van3,pers. comm, 2009)  
The support from the institutional sub-system was mainly focused on the 
shrimp culture sub-sector. Issues related to marketing, such as shrimp product 
quality management and facilitating coordination between supply chains agents 
were not being addressed by government agencies. Although government agencies 
have issued regulations about hygiene conditions and safety of products to regulate 
business in the food sub-sector, the managerial responsibility was shared among 
various state agencies, and the implementation of those regulations in domestic 
markets was very weak.  
                                               
3 Mr. Van is the Head of Office of Rural Development and Quality Management for Agricultural products, 
Department of Agriculture and Rural Development in TTH Province.  
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The policy for shrimp culture in the TGCH Lagoon differed before and after 
2004. Before 2004, the main focus of the institutional sub-system was to promote 
shrimp production as much as possible. Decision 773/QD-TTg of the Prime Minister 
in 1994 was an important policy milestone in government support for inland and 
coastal aquaculture. It emphasised mobilisation of domestic and overseas 
investment, and ‘reclaiming’ of inland and coastal lowland areas for aquaculture. The 
support for shrimp production was furthered in the Decision 251/QD-TTg of the 
Prime Minister in 1998 which identified fisheries as a key economic sector. Following 
decisions made by the central government, TTH Provincial People’s Committee (PPC) 
set up an objective in 2002 as part of Decision 3170/QD-UB to expand the shrimp 
area in TGCH Lagoon from 2,733 ha in 2002 to 5,939 ha in 2005. Consequently, TTH 
PPC encouraged the issuing of Red Book property rights to farmers who constructed 
shrimp ponds in the Lagoon and urged the VBARD to finance shrimp farmers. This 
strong support from government facilitated the rapid expansion of shrimp area in 
TGCH Lagoon. However, shrimp farmers suffered significant losses to aquatic 
diseases after 2004. Therefore, the main orientation of policy post-2004 was to 
reduce marginal shrimp areas and to strengthen management over shrimp culture. 
This orientation was evident with Decision 3014/QD-UBND in 2005 about 
management over centralised shrimp culture areas in TTH province and its updated 
version – Decision 31/QD-UBND in 2011.   
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3.2.2 Description of business relationships between chain actors  
 The consumption of shrimps produced in TGCH Lagoon was diversified with 
various final markets. Business actors and the flows of shrimp product are illustrated 
in Figure 3.1.  
The following classes of transaction help to describe business relationships 
between agents in the shrimp supply chain, there are the following notable groups 
of transactions: (i) farmers with input suppliers, (ii) farmers with shrimp collectors and 
(iii) shrimp collectors with downstream actors.  Feed and seed are the most 
important inputs for shrimp culture according to interviewed farmers. Therefore, 
relationships between farmers and seed and feed suppliers were investigated as 
representative of the relationship between farmers and input providers in general. 
However, wholesalers provide functions as both shrimp buyers and feed sellers, and 
they even provide credit to farmers in some cases. The interacting influences among 
different roles of wholesalers make the relationship between these business actors 
and farmers more complicated than the relationship between farmers and seed 
suppliers which can be considered as spot market. Therefore, different roles of 
wholesalers (including providing feed to farmers) are examined simultaneously in the 
second group.  
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3.2.2.1 Seed suppliers and farmers 
 There were two sources of seed supply for farmers including hatcheries 
located inside TTH Province and neighbouring provinces. The number of hatcheries 
inside TTH Province and their production capacity increased significantly between 
2001 and 2003 but fell sharply after 2004 (Table 3.2). There were a number of 
reasons for the growth and decline of shrimp seed production in the province. In the 
early 2000s, shrimp culture reached its highest levels in TGCH Lagoon, and increased 
the derived demand for shrimp seeds.  
Table 3.2: Shrimp seed production in TTH province, 2002-2008 
Year Number of 
seed 
stations 
Number of seeds 
produced inside TTH 
province (mil) 
Estimated 
quantity of seed 
demanded (mil) 
Estimated 
provincial 
production/ 
demand (%) 
2001 11 80 320 25 
2002 24 200 350 57 
2003 41 250 400 63 
2004 39 215 460 47 
2005 27 117 350 33 
2006 21 85 320 27 
2007 18 60 300 20 
2008 13 N/A N/A N/A 
Source: PECAAF (2008b). 
 However, demand for shrimp seed decreased sharply after 2004 as farmers 
quit the industry or reduced their shrimp production scale to avoid risks caused by 
diseases. Farmers reduced their shrimp production scale by applying lower shrimp 
stocking density and/or developing polyculture with shrimp and other brackish 
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products instead of shrimp monoculture. Among interviewed farmers, seven farmers 
who had large and medium production scales  applied lower stocking density. For 
instance, the stocking density of interviewed farmers who had semi-insentive culture 
reduced from about 17-18 seeds/m2 to 12-13 seeds/m2. This figure of improved-
extensive culture reduced from 13-14 seeds/m2 to 10-11 seeds/m2. Five of these 
seven farmers applied polyculture of shrimp and other brackish products including 
tilapia and crab. Tilapia and crabs were considered as more resistant to diseases 
accordingly to interviewees’ statements. All of the ten interviewed farmers also 
mentioned that a lot of other farmers in their communes also reduced their shrimp 
production scale and applied polyculture with other products. Three interviewed 
farmers who had relatively small-scale production did not change their stocking 
density and form of culture. Of these three small farmers,  two farmers undertook 
agriculture as their main livelihood so they did not pay much attention on shrimp 
culture. The remaining farmer did not experience any serious problems happening to 
his shrimp production.  
 Table 3.3 shows that, during the period 2004 to 2008, disease outbreaks 
affecting more than one-third of the Lagoon’s production area occurred in 2004 and 
2007. These outbreaks affected large numbers of shrimp farmers simultaneously. 
Therefore, the risk caused by shrimp diseases is not idiosyncratic but co -variant. 
Moreover, the yield losses affected agents at all stages of the local shrimp supply 
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chain as it reduced both the quantity and quality of products supplied. Hence this 
risk is also systemic.  
Table 3.3: Shrimp diseases during the period 2002–2008 
Type of disease 
Year 
Shrimp 
production 
 
(ha) 
Area 
infected 
with disease 
(ha) 
Share of 
production 
area infected 
(%) 
White-spot 
(ha) 
MBV 
(ha) 
Others 
(ha) 
2002 3197.00 171.36 5.36 28.00 64.00 79.36 
2003 3622.00 122.06 3.37 45.00 26.00 51.06 
2004 3998.00 1383.31 34.60 1126.00 125.00 132.31 
2005 3464.00 581.61 16.79 350.00 145.00 86.61 
2006 3024.00 170.25 5.63 138.04 3.80 28.41 
2007 3053.00 1084.43 35.52 890.63 2.50 191.30 
2008 2733.00 146.22 5.35 118.96   27.26 
Source: FSPS II, (2008). 
 Furthermore, TTH Province is not favourable for shrimp seed production 
because of its relatively low temperature. Consequently, many hatcheries in TTH 
Province closed leaving farmers more reliant on outside sources of shrimp seed. 
Farmers often organised themselves into groups of 5-7 buyers and dealt 
directly with seed suppliers in neighbouring provinces. All purchases were settled 
immediately with cash payment.     
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. The shrimp supply chain in TGCH Lagoon 
Feed suppliers/wholesalers Seed suppliers 
Shrimp farmers 
Local retailers Wholesalers in other 
provinces 
Processing & exporting 
companies 
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International markets 
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The two problems farmers faced in accessing shrimp seeds were the 
unreliable seed quality and the high transaction cost associated with buying seed 
from remote hatcheries. According to interviewed farmers, some farmers (especially 
those with extensive shrimp culture) used seed that is contaminated with bacteria. If 
raised in a polluted environment, those bacteria can cause widespread diseases. 
Moreover, several reports released by state agencies highlight the poor quality of 
shrimp seed (TTH Department of Fishery (DFI), 2007; TTH PECAAF, 2008b). According 
to these reports, there were two common diseases present in seed samples, namely 
white-spot (a disease that kills shrimps within a few days) and MBV (a disease that 
stunts growth resulting in undersized shrimps).  
The seed market was affected by the weakness in quality management. Before 
purchase, farmers should check the ability of shrimp seeds to swim upstream; their 
sizes; and the quarantine certificate certifying that the seed batch is disease free. Of 
these three checks, the quarantine certificate ought to be the most conclusive 
because the other two are less accurate indicators of disease. Quarantine certificates 
are issued by the Office of Rural Development and Quality Management for 
Agricultural Products. However, according to interviewed farmers the reliability of 
quarantine certificates was questionable as disease remained a serious problem even 
though they bought certified seed. There is no third-party accreditation of 
quarantine certificate.    
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3.2.2.2 Relationship between farmers and wholesalers 
There was a big network of wholesalers in the Lagoon. Large-scale 
wholesalers are key nodes in the collecting network as they implemented several 
functions including not only buying products but also supplying inputs (industrial 
feeds, medicines), and providing credit in some cases. Consequently, this sub-section 
focuses in the main on the relationship between farmers and large wholesalers. 
In the past, farmers often bought industrial feed for their entire crop. There 
were three forms of purchasing feeds:  
 Purchase by cash: farmers paid the full purchase price in full at the time of 
purchase. In this case, the transaction between farmers and wholesalers could be 
considered an impersonal spot market transaction. 
 Purchase on credit: Farmers were allowed to pay for feed after their shrimp 
harvest. Due to the deferred payment, farmers had to pay a higher price for feed. For 
instance: if farmers paid cash at the time of transaction the price of feed would be 
236,000 VND/10 kg in 2009, while if they paid after harvest, the price would be 
250,000 – 260,000 VND/10 kg.  
 Interlinked transaction: In this case, the feed was purchased on credit 
supplied by the wholesalers but farmers verbally agreed his or her shrimp crop being 
supplied to the wholesaler at a price below the market price of the time at harvest.  
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According to interviewed farmers, the majority of farmers preferred the last 
two ways of purchase because they seldom have efficient liquidity to pay cash up 
front. These trust-based relationships between farmers and wholesalers have been 
built up since the boom in shrimp farming since the early 1990s. In fact, there were a 
number of credit sources in rural areas of TTH Province including state-run banks, 
private banks, NGOs and money lenders (e.g. wholesalers). However, interviewed 
farmers stated that most of them had mortgaged their shrimp pond Red Books  
(Certificates of Title) to banks for loans that were not repaid. They could not repay 
loans to banks on time because of the  serious yield loss since 2004. This situation 
was common to shrimp farmers in TGCH Lagoon. For instance, nearly two-thirds of 
shrimp farmers in Quang An commune and one half of shrimp farmers in Vinh Hung 
commune had loan default with banks according to statements of interviewed 
farmers in these two communes. With those loan defaults, farmers could not borrow 
more money from banks for their production. It is the reason why yield loss after 
2004 obliged more farmers to seek credit-linked transactions.  
Even though these trust-based relationships between farmers and wholesalers 
evolved over time, there were some serious threats to them. Interviewed farmers 
argued that wholesalers, especially small scale wholesalers could lower the price of 
shrimp products and they could not have predictable and stable contracts from large 
scale wholesalers at the beginning of their crop. Three of the interviewed farmers in 
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Vinh Hung and Loc Binh communes contended that “there seem to be a verbal 
agreement among small scale wholesalers” to reduce their shrimp price at the end of 
their crop. Meanwhile, wholesalers complained that more and more farmers did not 
meet their payment obligation in the case of payment on credit, and engaged in 
side-selling in the case of interlinked transactions. A wholesaler in Vinh Hung 
commune - said “My hundreds of millions of VND were appropriated by shrimp farmers, in 
which the highest number is 20 millions and the lowest number is 3 millions. The business 
has become more and more difficult”.  
Interviewed farmers contended that loan default was limited to farmers whose 
yield losses were so serious that they did not have enough income to meet their loan 
obligations. Interviewed farmers argued that side-selling occurred because 
middlemen and wholesalers did not offer them predictable and stable consumption 
contracts. On the other hand, interviewed wholesalers stated that they could not 
offer such contracts to farmers because farmers were no longer able to supply a 
stable amount of quality shrimp products.  
Since 2004, the yield loss of farmers’ production led to significant changes in 
the business situation of wholesalers. According to statements of small scale 
wholesalers, they responded to unstable shrimp supply by reducing their business 
scale, looking for other products, strengthening relationships with other wholesalers 
to buy shrimp product with a good price, and even quitting the industry. A small 
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scale wholesaler in Thuan An township said that “the amount of shrimp that I bought in 
this crop is only equal to a half of the early 2000s”.  Most of the small scale wholesalers 
had other income-earning activities in addition to shrimp collecting. As a result, they 
did not have much incentive to maintain good relationships with farmers when yield 
losses happened.    
However, large scale wholesalers often had relatively different responses to 
farmers’ yield loss. According to statements of interviewed large scale wholesalers, all 
of them had started their business before 2000. Business investments included 
stores, transportation vehicles, and freezing facilities.. These investments could be 
the reason why none of them quit the industry as some small-scale wholesalers did. 
In order to respond to yield loss, they exerted much effort in different ways 
according to interviewed wholesalers’ statements. They reduced their business scale 
at some point and looked for other products. However, most of them tried to 
strengthen their relationships with farmers who had good source of supply, 
especially by providing credit to farmers, even although loan defaults still happened.            
Despite loan default and side-selling problems, wholesalers still wanted to 
maintain their trust-based relationships with farmers. The owner of a large company 
in Hue city, who had been unable to recover loans totalling over 1,000 million VND, 
said that “The amount of appropriated capital is really high, but we have to stand it. 
Farmers had to deal with too many difficulties in recent years, and we share these difficulties 
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with them because we want to keep good relationships with farmers for a long time”. The 
owner of a company in Phu Thuong commune said  that “My shrimp business could be 
profitable in this year and could be bad in the next year, however it would be still better than 
quitting  the industry and doing nothing”.   
Both wholesaler and farmer respondents contended that the greatest difficulty 
that farmers confronted was the spread of diseases in TGCH Lagoon after 2004. 
Widespread diseases came as an external threat rather than opportunistic behaviour 
of farmers, so wholesalers were willing to share some of the risks.  
However, loan default would gradually undermine the capital capacity of 
wholesalers and side-selling would exacerbate supply uncertainty. This prevented 
wholesalers from making predictable contracts with downstream business actors. 
Consequently, these problems would undermine trust-based relationship among 
farmers and wholesalers, and would harm both wholesalers and farmers in the long-
term unless the fundamental cause of widespread disease was solved. 
Quality management in transactions between farmers and shrimp collectors 
(both middlemen and wholesalers) was poor. The popular indicator of quality was 
the size of shrimp. No recognised standard of food safety and responsible 
production was applied. There was no value adding activity in the supply chain from 
farm-gate to wholesalers except some simple handling activities (e.g. transporting, 
cleaning and classifying products). The logistic conditions were also poor. Small scale 
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wholesalers often used cool boxes and ice to preserve shrimp products in 
transportation to wholesalers or retailers. Most wholesalers also did not have cold 
storage, and had to transport shrimp products to processing and exporting 
enterprises quickly.  
3.2.2.3 The relationship between wholesalers and downstream chain actors 
Processor-exporters often play an important role in a supply chain because 
they have more resources (e.g. finance, knowledge, market information, etc.). 
According to key informants, in the early 2000s, there were three processor-
exporters in TTH Province (Song Huong Joint Stock Company, Thai Binh Duong Ltd 
Company, and Song Phu Ltd Company). All of them mainly relied on shrimp supply 
of TGCH Lagoon. Their main markets included China, ASEAN, US, Japan and 
European countries. In 2005, the biggest company – Song Huong Joint Stock 
Company – faced a lot of difficulties as US and European agencies found anti-biotic 
residue in their shrimp products. This firm went bankrupt in 2007. Thai Binh Duong 
Ltd Company no longer relied on source of shrimp produced in TGCH Lagoon as the 
shrimp supply did not meet its quality and quantity requirements. Thus, in TTH 
Province only Song Phu Company bought shrimp produced in TGCH Lagoon and it 
exported mainly to China . There were also some firms located in other provinces 
buying shrimp products from TGCH and according to interviewed large-scale 
wholesalers, these firms also exported most of their products to China.     
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In the TGCH Lagoon, shrimp supply chain co-ordination between processors–
exporters and upstream business actors was not strong. No wholesalers had 
predictable and stable contracts from these firms. Rather, processor-exporters often 
informed wholesalers as to the price, quantity and quality of shrimp that they 
needed 3-7 days prior to the transaction, with adverse consequences for the 
coordination with farmers. It was the common situation of all interviewed large-scale 
wholesalers. A wholesaler in Thuan An township said that “Some processors–exporters 
who have bought shrimps produced in TGCH Lagoon now rely on sources of shrimp supply 
in Quang Tri and Quang Binh Provinces. For remaining ones, I rarely have contracts with 
them at the beginning of shrimp crop as I do not know how many tonnes of shrimps that I can 
supply to these firms”. It implies that some processors–exporters responded to yield 
loss of shrimp culture in TGCH Lagoon by looking for other sources of shrimp supply. 
Therefore, it can be firstly concluded that information sharing between wholesalers 
and processors–exporters was not effective. Furthermore, the limited contacts 
between wholesalers and processor–exporters could be explained as the supply of 
shrimp produced in TGCH Lagoon was unstable combined with processor–exporters 
having other sources of supply.  
Second, the quality management between processor-exporters and 
wholesalers was poor, as with farmers and shrimp collectors. They relied only on 
shrimp size to assess quality and no recognised quality standards (e.g. TCM, HACCP) 
were applied. All large-scale wholesalers remembered that some contracts of 
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processing–exporting firms in TTH Province with US and European companies were 
cancelled due to antibiotic residues in shrimp products in 2004 - 2005. However, 
they still had no awareness of recognised quality standards as no processor–
exporters required them to be applied in the following years. According to most 
interviewed wholesalers, they thought that China markets would not require 
recognised quality standards so it would not be necessary to apply these standards. 
Apart from processors and exporters, retailers purchased a significant 
proportion of shrimp produced in TGCH Lagoon according to interviewed farmers 
and middlemen. Relationships between middlemen and retailers were much less 
standardised than those among wholesalers and processor-exporters because the 
volumes transacted were much smaller. Middlemen and retailers have limited 
capacity and could not lead effective chain coordination.  
3.2.3 Fundamental problems in the shrimp supply chain  
It can be concluded that the TGCH shrimp supply chain was not performing 
well. In particular, the evidence showed that the chain lacked customer focus and 
effective systems to share information and control product quality. However, it is 
important to ask why the supply chain was not performing well when less than a 
decade earlier it supplied substantial quantities of quality shrimp via long-term 
relational contracts between farmers and wholesalers that linked credit and feed 
supply to the purchase of the farmer’s crop.  
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 The local shrimp industry changed dramatically after the outbreak of 
widespread and persistent disease in 2004 (Table 3.3) that reduced both quantity 
and quality of shrimp product throughout the Lagoon. The resulting yield risk made 
it impossible to fulfil supply contracts all along the shrimp supply chain. In short, 
relational contracts were damaged by environmental uncertainty as heightened yield 
risk undermined efforts to coordinate value-adding activities, rendering the supply 
chain ineffective. 
According to Subasinghe, Bontad Reantaso and McGladdery (2001), 
pathogens and the environment play an important role in the spread of shrimp 
diseases. Water pollution is the fundamental problem as it leaves all producers 
vulnerable to diseases even if their shrimp seed is disease free. Heightened pollution 
of TGCH Lagoon since 2004 has been identified as a serious threat to local livelihood 
by state agencies, researchers and the farmers interviewed in this study. State 
agencies (TTH PPC, 2005 & 2007; TTH Department of Science and Technology 
(DoST), 2005; TTH DFI, 2007; TTH PECAAF, 2008b) acknowledged the pollution threat 
to local communities - including shrimp farmers - as early as 2005. Hop et al. (2008) 
and Thung (2007) conducted experiments that showed some alarming indicators of 
deteriorating water quality in TGCH Lagoon between 1998 and 2004. These 
indicators included: diminishing levels of diffused oxygen (i.e. an increase of organic 
pollution), especially in places close to crowded shrimp farming areas; greater 
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nutrient loads entering the lagoon and less absorptive capacity of the natural 
environment -  conditions conducive to eutrophication; higher levels of total 
coliform density; and higher levels of organochlorine pesticides in the sediment. 
  There are at least three sources of pollution in TGCH Lagoon (Hop et al., 2005; 
Nga, 2006), including: (i) aquaculture production and other livelihood activities in the 
lagoon; (ii) agricultural production activities in upstream areas; and (iii) industrial 
production and urban dwellers in the lagoon catchment (Figure 3.2). There is no 
study to date quantifying the respective contribution of each of these sources of 
pollution. However, aquaculture - and shrimp culture in particular – has been clearly 
linked by Tuyen (2002) and Huong and Berkes (2011) to the Lagoon’s environmental 
deterioration. According to these researchers, the dense distribution of ponds and 
net-enclosures impeded water exchange, restricted the dispersion and development 
of aquatic plants and accelerated sediment deposition. Intensive production 
methods (e.g. supplementary feeding and use of medicines) adopted by farmers 
aggravated the problem (Binh, 2005; Linh, 2005).  
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Source: Adapted from Cartographic Publishing House (2002).  
Figure 3.2. Catchment of TGCH Lagoon 
Some authors blame the pollution on uncontrolled privatisation of the Lagoon 
that facilitated the ‘boom’ in shrimp production (Tuyen, 2002; Huong & Berkes, 
2011). To examine this argument it is useful to trace recent institutional changes in 
the Lagoon. Before 1975, there were two kinds of lagoon use, namely Dai Nghe 
(fixed-gear fishing) and Tieu Nghe (mobile fish catching). Fishing was regulated by 
village authorities, implying that lagoon water within their areas of jurisdiction was a 
common property resource. However, village authorities also auctioned off exclusive 
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use rights to fixed-gear fishers (Tuyen, 2002) and these rights could be transferred 
between generations. By 1975, much of the peripheral lagoon bed had been de facto 
privatised even though natural resources were statutorily owned by the state. 
Between 1975 and 1986, fishing cooperatives replaced village authorities as the 
administrators of use rights to catch fish in lagoons (Huong & Berkes, 2011). After 
1986, Doi Moi policy reforms shifted production decisions and property rights to 
households, starting with use rights but extending to temporary transfer rights in 
1993 and to permanent transfer rights in 2003 (Huong & Berkes, 2011). 
This brief description of institutional change is both naive and misleading. It is 
naive because it does not define what was being privatised, and misleading because 
it creates the impression that institutional change was driven exogenously by the 
state. It was the lagoon bed that was privatised, and not the water above it. The 
exclusive rights enjoyed by fixed-gear fishers related to a specific part of the lagoon 
bed on which nets and bamboo fences were erected. The water above the lagoon 
bed washed through the nets and fences much like the air above a privately-owned 
farm. From a fisher’s perspective, the water was a common property resource 
because rules governing the extraction of fish were policed and enforced (at least 
during the time that fishing was regulated by village authorities). However, this 
situation changed when the water gained a new use – shrimp production. 
    
68 
 
In 1985, the government introduced Penaeus monodon (the giant tiger shrimp) 
that could be sold on lucrative export markets. However, households were denied 
the right to practice shrimp aquaculture. This privilege was granted only to state-
owned enterprises, but these enterprises were poorly managed (Quyen4, Pers.Com, 
2009). In 1993, the state relented and issued Decree 64/CP which allowed 
households to exercise exclusive rights to the lagoon bed (in certain parts of the 
Lagoon) in order to practice aquaculture. Demand for secure property rights was 
strong because export prices for giant tiger shrimps were increasing (FAO, undated) 
and farmers wanted to protect their investment in shrimp enclosures (Phap et al., 
2002, p30). The Provincial People’s Committee responded by issuing Red Book 
property rights to fixed-gear fishers located near the shoreline who converted their 
net and fence enclosures into earthen-walled ponds for shrimp production (Huong 
& Berkes, 2011). Shrimp farmers operating in deeper water further from the shore 
privatised the lagoon bed by erecting fine-mesh nets. Many of these farmers were 
allowed to formalise their de facto exclusive rights to the lagoon bed by taking up 
five-year and one-year permits issued by district and commune authorities 
respectively (Huong & Berkes, 2011). The permits sanctioned exclusive operational 
rights within the enclosed area. 
                                               
4 Mr. Quyen is the Coordinator of Fisheries Sector Program Support (2nd Stage) in TTH Province, 
Department of Agriculture and Rural Development in TTH Province.  
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This process of institutional change is consistent with the Evolutionary Theory 
of Land Rights (Demsetz, 1967) or Coasian ‘transaction cost’ model of institutional 
change which, in the context of property rights to land, contends that secure tenure 
and low transaction costs emerge in response to population growth and new 
technology (Feder & Noronha, 1987). The generic explanation starts with land 
becoming relatively scarce owing to population pressure and better prospects for 
commercial farming. This is expected to induce a change towards private land rights 
because farmers have an incentive to invest but are unable to internalise the benefits 
of their effort unless they can exclude other users (Ault & Rutman, 1979). While the 
Coasian model has been criticised for ignoring problems of collective action that may 
prevent farmers from launching an effective lobby (Olson, 1965), political resistance 
(Thomson & Lyne, 1993) and path dependency (Bardhan, 1989) these potential 
barriers to institutional change were obviously not limiting in Doi  Moi  Vietnam. 
Regardless of what drove privatisation in TGCH Lagoon, it is important to 
remember that it related only to the lagoon bed. To emphasise this point, it is useful 
to distinguish between shrimp farmers who constructed earthen-walled ponds in the 
shallows of the Lagoon (lower earth ponds) and those operating in deeper water 
who erected net enclosures to contain their shrimps. When considering net 
enclosures, it is clear that the water passing through the nets is not a private 
resource (characterised by exclusive property rights) but rather a common pool 
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resource (characterised by inclusive property rights). Moreover, the use of water to 
grow shrimps was not governed by the common property rules that regulated the 
extraction of fish. Like the air above a factory, the lagoon water became an open 
access resource to farmers producing shrimps in net enclosures. The same argument 
can be applied to pond farmers if they are able to discharge polluted water into the 
lagoon. In theory, regulations preventing the discharge of polluted water from 
shrimp ponds would internalise the cost of pollution to these farmers, encouraging 
them to adopt cleaner production methods. In practice, it is not cost -effective to 
police such regulations given the existence of thousands of small and inaccessible 
ponds. 
The privatisation of TGCH Lagoon for shrimp production was not well 
regulated. Zoning was not implemented and natural waterways were blocked by 
earthen walls and fine-mesh nets (Tuyen et al., 2010). Pond farmers were not 
required to construct treatment ponds where polluted water could be cleaned 
before it was released into the lagoon. Not only did the area used to produce 
shrimps increase rapidly but farmers also adopted intensive production methods 
(Huong & Berkes, 2011). The evolving mix of private and open access property rights 
would have encouraged shrimp farmers to intensify their production methods as 
they were able to internalise the benefits of their investment while externalising the 
cost of their water pollution. In addition, the Red Books issued to many owners 
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improved their ability to finance investments in shrimp farming because formal 
lenders accepted these certificates as collateral for loans (Tinh, 2005; Hoa, 2010). 
Together, the expansion and intensification of shrimp production elevated the 
concentration of contaminants (excess feed, shrimp waste and chemicals) over a 
larger part of the lagoon. In the absence of zoning to keep natural waterways open, 
it was inevitable that water quality would deteriorate. 
Provincial policy-makers responded to the problem of blocked waterways 
long before the disease problem emerged. Their response was motivated by 
concerns about sustainable use of lagoon resources and a burgeoning social 
problem (Tuyen et al., 2010). De facto privatisation of the lagoon bed reduced both 
access to, and the area of, open water for fishing. Mobile-gear fishers, who lacked 
the resources needed to privatise the lagoon bed, were thus further marginalised. In 
2001, the provincial government adopted a proposal to phase out all net enclosures 
by 2010. Implementation of this policy stalled in the face of resistance from the 
owners of net enclosures and it took a threat of force to clear just some nets from 
designated waterways (Tuyen et al., 2010). No compensation was offered for net 
enclosures that were expropriated as the owners did not have Red Book property 
rights. 
Failure of this ‘top down’ intervention encouraged the provincial government 
to support a strategy of co-management initiated by an interdisciplinary research 
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team based at Hue University. In essence, this strategy involves compromises 
negotiated between government authorities at the local and district level and Fishery 
Associations representing multiple user groups at the village or sub-village level 
(Tuyen et al., 2010). The first priority is to encourage the owners of net enclosures to 
reduce the size of their enclosures in order to create gaps between them. These gaps 
will give mobile-gear fishers better access to open fishing water and are also 
expected to benefit shrimp farmers by reducing disease through improved water 
flow. Even so, the pilot project described by Tuyen et al. (2010) has confronted many 
challenges and progress has been patchy and slow.  
Opening the waterways is a necessary step in promoting a sustainable shrimp 
industry at TGCH Lagoon, and compensation would no doubt expedite this process. 
Some might argue that compensation should be offered to help achieve the 
provincial government’s 2001 policy proposal to remove all net enclosures. However, 
the Lagoon’s own history emphasises the critical relationship between shrimp 
farming and private property rights to the lagoon bed. Removing these rights would 
be disastrous for the shrimp industry and local livelihoods. Apart from zoning to 
clear the Lagoon’s waterways, policies to promote sustainable shrimp production 
should focus on pollution abatement instruments that induce farmers to adopt 
cleaner production methods. Such instruments could be market based, regulatory or 
involve institutional innovation to manage lagoon water as a common property 
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resource in shrimp production. These instruments are discussed and evaluated in the 
context of Tam Giang Lagoon in the chapters which follow. 
3.3 Concluding remarks  
The initial investigations reported in this chapter were undertaken from a 
supply-chain perspective and were guided by supply chain theory. These initial 
investigations were set up within an exploratory framework, and it was envisaged 
that this would be followed by a second stage of in–depth investigations drawing on 
these same supply chain theories. However, there was a clear emergent insight from 
the first stage investigations that the over-riding issue was supply chain failure 
arising from a production decline that was itself a consequence of shrimp disease, 
which in turn was a consequence of pollution within the Lagoon. These pollution 
issues were apparently linked to issues of intensification combined with privatisation 
of the Lagoon bed but with open access to the water of the Lagoon (Figure 3.3). 
Accordingly, it was decided that the second stage of the investigations should turn 
away from the supply chain framework to investigate the prime cause of failure.  
At this point the thesis therefore turns to a different analytical framework 
which draws on the principles of resource economics and property rights. 
Subsequently, consideration is also given to co-management principles as an 
implementation strategy. 
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           Figure 3.3. Weakening of the shrimp supply chain in TGCH Lagoon 
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CHAPTER 4 
THEORIES OF POLLUTION MANAGEMENT 
 
4.1 Introduction and methods 
The exploratory research reported in Chapter 3 provided clear evidence of an 
endogenous pollution problem in the TGCH shrimp supply chain. This result was 
consistent with secondary data showing the spread of shrimp diseases and declining 
area of shrimp production in TGCH Lagoon, and with theoretical arguments relating 
to changes in property rights to the Lagoon’s resources. Chapter 4 marks the 
beginning of the second stage of this study. It applies Gordon’s (1954) model of 
common property to explain why the mix of private rights to the lagoon bed and 
open access to the lagoon water encouraged shrimp farmers to adopt intensive 
production methods that proved to be unsustainable, and then draws on the 
environmental economics literature to construct a set of possible pollution 
abatement instruments and normative criteria to assess these instruments. This 
represents a first step in addressing the policy related research questions listed in 
Chapter 1. 
 There is a shift from the positive, case study research strategy employed in the 
first stage of the study to a normative, analytical research strategy in the second 
stage. This change in research strategy was necessary because farmers and other 
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agents in the TGCH shrimp supply chain had little or no experience with policy 
instruments to control water pollution. Relevant environmental economics literature 
was reviewed to identify a set of pollution abatement instruments that could be 
applied to shrimp farmers in the TGCH Lagoon, and to synthesise a set of normative 
criteria against which these instruments could be tested in order to recommend an 
appropriate policy instrument. These analyses also drew on e-mail correspondence 
with key informants from the TTH Provincial People’s Committee, Department of 
Planning and Investment, and the Department of Agriculture and Rural 
Development. These officials provided useful information about current policy 
instruments, their achievements and challenges. Chapter 5 applies the assessment 
criteria developed in Chapter 4, and Chapter 6 considers ways of implementing the 
recommended policy instrument. This discussion is informed by a review of recent 
literature dealing with co-management of common property resources.  
Chapter 4 comprises of four sections. Section 4.2 describes approaches in 
pollution management and presents a taxonomy of pollution control measures in 
the context of TGCH Lagoon. Section 4.3 examines difficulties in applying pollution 
controls, especially in the context of developing countries. The final section proposes 
a set of normative criteria to assess pollution abatement instruments that could be 
applied to shrimp farmers (and other fixed-gear aquaculturists) operating in the 
TGCH Lagoon.   
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4.2 Review of environmental policies for managing pollution 
4.2.1 Approaches in pollution management 
 Pollution is an economic externality. According to Huppes and Simonis (2009, 
p259) externalities occur when the total social costs of an action differ from the 
private costs for the persons (or organisations) deciding on that action, and the 
difference between social costs and private costs spill over to others. A negative 
externality exists when the total social cost outweighs the private costs and 
conversely, a positive externality occurs when the total social benefit is higher than 
the private benefits.  
There are two approaches to remedy externalities, namely the Pigouvian 
(Pigou, 1932) and Coasian (Coase, 1960) approaches. The Pigouvian approach 
focuses on the role of the state through intervening in existing markets (e.g. through 
imposition of physical regulations or taxes). The Coasian approach emphasises the 
creation of new markets to exchange property rights (e.g. tradable pollution 
permits). Accordingly, these two approaches involve state and market mechanisms in 
different ways and with different emphases.  
According to the Pigouvian approach, the state should take an active role in 
dealing with negative externalities like pollution. State interventions may take the 
form of taxation or subsidies, direct ownership, participation in investment and 
provision of goods and services, or administrative and regulatory controls (Adams et 
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al., 2003; Hallett, 1979; Whitehead, 1983). On the other hand, Coase’s Theorem states 
that externalities can be internalised by creating new property rights and that the 
initial assignment of property rights does not make any difference to efficiency 
because a Pareto-optimal allocation will emerge through exchanging property rights 
among parties when they have secure property rights and transactions are 
frictionless. However, the initial assignment of rights does affect the distribution of 
income (i.e. it affects equity). Furthermore, Coase (1960) argues that when 
governments intervene to deal with externalities, corrective measures are associated 
with other changes which might be more harmful than the original deficiency.  
However, transactions are not frictionless and high transaction costs could 
constrain or even prevent the exchange of property rights (Furubotn & Ritchter, 
2000). Institutions like formal laws and informal customs are important determinants 
of incentives and transaction costs (Benham & Benham, 1997; Coase, 1937, 1960, 
1992; North, 1993; Matthews, 1996; Eggertsson, 1997; Dawkins, 2000) which, in turn, 
affect exchange and production (Shirley, 2006, p611). Institutions are created not 
only by state bureaucracies but also by private parties (e.g. private firms). However, 
many scholars emphasise the role of the state in creating and protecting property 
rights (Matthews, 1986; Przeworski, 1997; Deininger & Binswanger, 1999; Dawkins, 
2000; Deininger, 2003); and providing a legal system that facilitates market 
exchanges in those rights (Deininger, 2003; Deininger & Binswanger, 1999).  
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Some state interventions constrain the Coasian approach by attenuating 
property rights. Cheung, (1974) and Lai (1997, 2002) argue that attenuation erodes 
the exclusivity of private property rights by limiting freedom either in the derivation 
of income from the use of resources, or in the transfer of these interests. According 
to Furubotn and Richter (1991, pp1-32) attenuation can be considered as shrinkage 
of economic options and reduction in asset value. In addition, state intervention 
might lead to monopoly of ownership, management and control over resources 
(Adams, Disberry, Hutchinson & Munjoma, 2001, 2002) thereby preventing private 
parties from acquiring property rights for their development needs, distorting price 
signals (Munro-Fause, 1999), and encouraging perverse incentive/rent–seeking 
behaviour (De Alessi, 1980; Moe, 1984, Dawkins, 2000).  
The Pigouvian and Coasian approaches suggest different ways of managing 
externalities in general, and pollution in particular. With the Pigouvian approach, 
government can take the role of regulator by providing regulations, manipulating 
incentives and/or intervening directly. With the Coasian approach, government 
should focus on assigning rights, adjudicating conflicts and facilitating negotiation 
among private parties (Richards, 2000). Nevertheless, a common point shared by 
these approaches involves the change of property rights.  
Generally, there are two types of change in property rights; these are 
voluntary exchanges of rights between individuals in a given structure, and change in 
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the structure of property rights. Voluntary exchanges of rights re-allocate the 
property rights within a given structure of property rights. The second type of 
change includes the creation of new rights, the abrogation of or limitation on 
existing rights and changes from common to private and vice versa (Quiggin, 1988). 
Such changes translate into environmental polices.      
4.2.2 Taxonomy of pollution control policies in the context of shrimp culture in 
TGCH Lagoon 
Taxonomy is a classification of knowledge. It is used for organising a body of 
knowledge from several sources. Environmental management is the process of 
articulating the different social agents that interact within a certain space, with the 
purpose of guaranteeing the adaptation of the means for exploiting environmental 
resources (natural, economic and socio-cultural) to the specificity of the 
environment. Environmental management  aims to enhance environmental 
sustainability or the management of environmental resources in such a way that their 
qualities are maintained according to societal norms and standards (Goodland, 
1995). Environmental policy instruments are necessary to co-ordinate efforts 
amongst social agents including public and private organisations and individuals. 
According to Huppes and Simonis (2009, p254), “Environmental policy instruments are 
structured activities aimed at changing other activities in society to achieve environmental 
goals in a particular time schedule”. There are several ways to establish a taxonomy of 
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environmental policy instruments according to how organisations and individuals in 
the society are co-ordinated to achieve environmental objectives. 
 Vedung (1998) proposes three basic categories of policy instruments 
including legal instruments (i.e. direct regulations), economic incentives, and 
informative instruments. Legal instruments reflect the direct intervention of the state 
and they do not provide discretion to polluters. Economic policy instruments aim at 
altering the benefits and/or the costs of polluters. These policy instrument s give 
discretion to polluters to choose their own optimal action based on altered benefits 
and costs of actions. Policy instruments in this category include subsidies, taxes and 
fees, and tradable permits. Third, informative instruments alter the priorities of 
polluters. Through altered priorities, polluters could have voluntary actions that 
contribute to a better environmental condition.   
The World Bank (1997) groups environmental policy instruments into the 
following three categories: regulations using current markets (e.g. taxes and 
subsidies), creation of new markets, and engagement of the public (informative 
instruments are the main tools in this category). The World Bank (WB) puts emphasis 
on the role of the state in creating a market to exchange pro perty rights. This 
category includes not only tradable permits (referring to voluntary exchange of 
property rights) but also the creation of new property rights and changes to existing 
property rights. These changes can bring about improved conditions of 
    
82 
 
environmental management (e.g. when privatisation internalises a negative 
externality). 
The OECD (2007) provides a synthesis of environmental policy instruments 
applied by European countries that yields a classification similar to that produced by 
the World Bank (1997). The report (OECD, 2007) emphasises the importance of using 
a mix of instruments to address a specific environmental problem because these 
problems are often multifaceted. For example, the location and timing of pollution 
may be no less important than the volume of pollution.. In addition, certain 
instruments can be mutually reinforcing. For instance, a labelling scheme may 
enhance the responsiveness of firms and households to an environmental tax, and 
the tax may help to draw attention to the labelling scheme. 
The success of informative measures relies on a credible enforcement threat, 
together with a monitoring program by a respected and independent third party, 
and peer sanction for under-performance (Alberini & Segerson, 2002; Krarup, 2001; 
Lyon & Maxwell, 2002; Walton, 2000; Welch & Hibiki, 2002; Potoski & Prakash, 2004). 
Hence, informative instruments should be considered complementary to regulations 
rather than as an alternative (Lyon & Maxwell, 2002).  
 Shrimp farming in TGCH Lagoon produces excessive emissions because the 
lagoon water is an open access resource and farmers can therefore externalise the 
costs of their own pollution.. The absence of effective zoning exacerbates this 
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problem because blocked waterways diminish the carrying capacity of the lagoon 
(Sub-section 3.2.3). Pollution control policies need to be designed to solve both the 
blocked waterways and over-exploitation problem.  
4.2.2.1 Policy options for reducing emission from shrimp enclosures 
Over-exploitation of the lagoon water can largely be explained using the 
production function approach proposed by Gordon (1954) in analysis of open access 
fisheries. Figure 4.1 measures output (in value terms) on the vertical axis and shrimp 
seed input on the horizontal axis. The cost of adding one unit of input is Ps. If a 
single farmer has exclusive use of the lagoon water and is a rational profit maximiser, 
he or she will keep adding shrimp seed to the lagoon water until its marginal value 
product (MVPs) equals Ps.  In this ‘private property’ case, the equilibrium stocking 
rate occurs at level Q1 and the farmer earns rent equal to VNPs. If this farmer’s 
property right to the lagoon water is secure and he or she is unable to externalise 
the cost of pollution by discharging contaminated lagoon water into the sea, the 
equilibrium stocking rate will not exceed the maximum sustainable stocking rate (Q3) 
even if Ps=0.  
On the other hand, when many farmers share the lagoon water without 
restriction (even though they do not share the lagoon bed), the equilibrium stocking 
rate will increase to level Q2 because each farmer - acting independently to maximise 
his or her individual profit - will keep adding shrimps until their average value 
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product (AVPs) equals Ps. A consequence of this rational behaviour is that all rents 
are dissipated. As demonstrated by Gordon (1954), the open access equilibrium 
could exceed the maximum sustainable stocking rate depending on the price of Ps 
and the characteristics of the externalities. Although, this ‘tragedy of the commons’ is 
not a necessary outcome of open access as argued by Hardin (1968), there is strong 
evidence as presented in Chapter 3 that this situation is occurring in the TGCH 
Lagoon.  Despite these negative outcomes, farmers sharing the lagoon water under 
conditions of open access have no economic incentive to reduce their own stocking 
rates as the rents generated by input reduction would accrue to other farmers.  
 
 
                                   
  
                                                              
 
          
 
Figure 4.1. Shrimp stocking rates for private and open access lagoon water 
Source: Adapted from Gordon (1954). 
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In order to reduce over exploitation of TGCH Lagoon, policy-makers can 
adopt physical regulations, market-based measures, or alter property rights. Physical 
regulations refer to instruments that dictate a physical limit on the amount of shrimp 
produced (output quotas), the amounts of inputs used (input quotas) or on the 
amount of pollution discharged (pollution permits). Market-based measures refer to 
instruments like input taxes (to increase the marginal cost of raising more shrimps), 
output taxes, pollution taxes, tradable output or input quotas, and tradable pollution 
permits. Changing the property rights regime refers to either privatisation or 
‘unitisation’ of the open access common pool resource. Unitisation implies a shift 
from open to common property where rates of exploitation are governed by rules 
established and enforced by or with user groups. The alternative of privatisation of 
TGCH lagoon water to individuals (in contrast to the existing privatisation of the 
lagoon bed) is not considered to be practical owing to natural movement of water in 
the lagoon. In addition, privatising the lagoon water to individual shrimp farmers will 
not eliminate its over-exploitation if farmers are still able to externalise the cost of 
pollution by discharging contaminated water into public waterways.  
Quotas on shrimp products and inputs for shrimp production can take the 
forms of non-transferable (physical regulations) and transferable quotas (market -
based instruments). The environmental outcomes of these quotas are the same as 
they both dictate limits on production. They also entail similar challenges in 
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monitoring and enforcing. However, transferable quotas are expected to result in 
better allocative efficiency over time as they impose an opportunity cost on less 
effective farmers who stand to earn more by selling or leasing their quotas to more 
effective farmers. To better realise these allocative efficiency advantages, input and 
output quotas should be detached from the right of access to lagoon water or the 
lagoon bed. The range of pollution control instruments considered for shrimp 
farmers in TGCH Lagoon and assessed in Chapter 5 therefore excludes quotas that 
are non-transferable or which are attached to other resources. It implies that these 
optional policy instruments for shrimp culture are all market -based measures.  
There is a difference between the taxonomic categories of market-based 
instruments and unitisation. Market-based instruments are designed to operate 
within a particular property right regime. Unitisation, on the other hand, represents a 
shift to a new property right regime. Regulations and market based instruments 
recommended for users of open access resources will differ from those 
recommended for users of private property because the institutional rules associated 
with each of these property right regimes create different incentives and problems 
(Slangen, Loucks & Slangen, 2008, p318). For this reason, market-based pollution 
control instruments considered for farmers who have private access to the TGCH 
Lagoon bed and open access to the lagoon water are assessed in Chapter 5, whereas 
unitisation is assessed in Chapter 6. 
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4.2.2.2 Policy options for opening waterways 
 Opening waterways in TGCH Lagoon will entail some expropriation of shrimp 
farms. According to Tuyen et al. (2010), TTH provincial government established an 
objective of phasing out all net enclosures in the Lagoon by 2010. At first, the 
government adopted a top-down approach in some communes (Tuyen et al., 2010). 
Commune and village leaders informed farmers of the provincial government’s 
decision and demarcated waterways according to guidelines set by the district 
government. Shrimp farmers were then instructed to remove any parts of their net -
enclosures within the demarcated waterways. This approach failed in the face of firm 
resistance from the owners of net enclosures.  
Recognising the high political risk of the top-down approach, the provincial 
government agreed to support an experiment in co-management in which some 
control over shared lagoon resources would be devolved to local Fishery 
Associations in certain parts of TGCH Lagoon (Tuyen et al. 2010). These user groups 
were given legal status in the national Fisheries Law of 2003. According to Tuyen et 
al. (2010), the experiment was initiated in 2004 with a workshop that included 
researchers based at Hue University of Agriculture and Forestry (HUAF), district 
leaders, relevant departments of district government and commune leaders to 
explore collaborative ways of opening waterways. In 2005, a Provincial Decision (No. 
4260/2005) formalised the role of Fishery Associations in local management of 
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community lagoon resources. (Tuyen et al., 2010). The HUAF research team had been 
working towards common property solutions to this problem with Lagoon users in 
the Sam Choun area since 1996, well before their efforts were given official support. 
By 2009, after more than a decade of participatory action research, only modest 
progress had been made with the realignment of farm boundaries to open the 
waterways (Tuyen et al., 2010). 
Persistent resistance to opening waterways is to be expected when farmers 
with officially recognised rights to the lagoon bed are not compensated for property 
expropriated in the public interest. To date, the government has not offered 
compensation for expropriated net-enclosures even where the owners were 
previously granted permits by commune authorities. Compensation has been offered 
only to pond farmers in possession of Red Book property rights, and the amount of 
compensation offered has been well below market prices paid for ponds (TTH PPC, 
2011). A more generous compensation policy would no doubt help to expedite 
agreements on waterways, a process that is widely viewed as necessary to restore 
and maintain the productive capacity of TGCG Lagoon. However, opening the 
waterways is unlikely to be sufficient if farmers continue to overexploit the lagoon 
water. While strongly supporting collaborative efforts to open the waterways and a 
more generous approach to compensation, the balance of this thesis focuses on 
policy options to reduce emissions from shrimp ponds. These include unitisation and 
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market-based instruments like transferable quotas for inputs, outputs and pollution 
rights, and taxes on inputs, outputs and emissions. Chapter 5 assesses the suitability 
of each of these market-based instruments for TGCH Lagoon, and Chapter 6 
considers an extension of the unitisation or co-management approach recently 
adopted by the provincial government. 
4.3 Problems of pollution control policies 
Pollution is a global problem despite the best efforts of many governments. 
This situation implies shortcomings in pollution control measures. The literature 
points out two types of problems in applying environmental policy instruments. 
These problems include inherent shortcomings of environmental policy instruments 
and difficulties in applying those instruments in developing countries.    
4.3.1 Inherent problems of environmental policy instruments  
The role of policy-makers is to design policies so as to confront polluters with 
the costs of their action in order to increase social benefits (O’Shea, 2002). The first 
order condition states that the optimal level of emission for society is identified by 
equality between the marginal benefit of an extra unit of emission and the marginal 
damage of that unit. However, pollution control policies seldom achieve this optimal 
level in the real world because they are associated with several shortcomings 
(especially policies dealing with non-point source pollution (NPS).  
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The analysis of inherent problems in pollution control policies starts with 
instruments to address point source (PS) pollution which are usually much simpler 
than instruments to address NPS pollution. In order to achieve the first order 
condition, it must be assumed that policy-makers have complete knowledge about 
the polluter’s marginal benefit function and its damage function to design optimal 
policy. However, this assumption is not realistic in practice. First, firms are likely to 
withhold information about their benefit functions to evade pollution control 
policies. As O’Shea (2002) argued, if the government introduces quantitative-based 
measures, firms tend to overstate their benefit functions (Figure 4.2a), and 
conversely, if price-based measures are applied, firms tend to understate their 
benefit functions (Figure 4.2b). Second, estimation of the damage function is hardly 
precise because the environment is a non-market good. Consequently, pollution 
policies tend to ignore the notion of an optimal level of emission and instead follow 
a more pragmatic approach which is based on an acceptable standard of pollution 
(O’Shea, 2002). Policy-makers can adjust their policy instruments in a trial–and–error 
fashion (e.g. adjust the pollution tax rate) so as to prevent pollution from exceeding 
the acceptable standard. The trial–and–error process in adjusting pollution polices 
requires a precondition that policy-makers can monitor the activities of individual 
polluters together with (as a minimum) the total emissions of polluters in aggregate 
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who are subject to the instrument, and hence the contribution to the ambient 
environment. 
                                  
  
                                                                       
                                                                         
                                                                                                                
                                                             
                Q1                    Q2                                               Q3       Q4          Q5      
 
(4.2a) - quantitative-based measure                  (4.2b) – price-based measure 
Figure 4.2. Polluters’ behaviours responding to environmental policy instruments. 
Source: Adapted from O’Shea (2002). 
Notes:  
- MD is marginal damage function of polluters. 
- MB is marginal benefit function of polluters. 
- MB’ is overstated marginal benefit function of polluters in (a) and understated marginal benefit 
function of polluters in (b). 
- t and t’ are respectively the right tax rate and the tax rate applied when polluters understate their 
marginal benefit function. 
In the case of NPS, the nature of the problem is much more complicated due 
to the fundamental difference between PS and NPS pollution. According to 
Xepapadeas (1999), NPS pollution is distinguished from PS pollution by difficulties in 
recognising sources, size, distinctive characteristics of sources, and time lags 
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between causes and effects of emissions. Moreover, stochastic elements are added 
to the pollution dispersion process by weather condition (e.g. wind, flood, etc). As a 
result, identifying individual NPS pollution sources and measuring their contribution 
to ambient pollution become impossible in practice. In short, there is a large 
information gap between regulators and polluters in the case of NPS pollution.  
The pollution caused by shrimp farming in TGCH Lagoon is a typical NPS 
pollution because there are thousands of small shrimp farmers. Accordingly, it is 
likely to be prohibitively costly to monitor pollution discharged from individual 
shrimp ponds. 
Braden and Segerson (1993) separate this information gap into two 
components. 
- Problems of monitoring and measurement: these problems refer to inability 
to directly monitor individual emissions or to infer them from observable inputs or 
from the ambient concentration of the pollutant.  
- Natural variability component: this refers to weather conditions and 
technology variability which results in stochastic pollution processes. 
The information gap between regulators and polluters gives rise to free-rider 
problems and as a consequence, increases difficulties in managing NPS pollution. 
The relationship between regulators and polluters can be considered as a typical 
    
93 
 
principal–agent problem5. In this relationship, polluters can free-ride6 taking 
advantage of the information asymmetry about their real emissions. In the presence 
of such market failure, standard instruments of environmental policy such as 
Pigouvian taxes, tradable permits and emission standards do not create pertinent 
incentives to individual polluters. The information asymmetry causes a prohibitively 
high transaction costs for regulators and polluters to get complete information.         
4.3.2 Difficulties in applying pollution control policies in developing countries  
Pollution happens in both developing and developed countries. However, 
developing countries face more difficulties in managing pollution. Rietbergen-
McCracken and Abaza (2000) argue that developing countries have more severe 
environmental degradation while they also have a greater reliance on environmental 
resources for economic development. In addition, developing countries often have a 
weak institutional base and limited capacity to implement environmental policy 
(Rietbergen-McCracken & Abaza, 2000; Blackman & Harrington, 2000).  
In the context of developing countries and countries in transition (CITs), 
pollution control policies are polarising into two distinct points of view (Kathuria, 
2006). The first favours the use of market-based instruments (MBIs). The reason for 
supporting MBIs is that they link economic rationality with environmental outcomes 
                                               
5 A situation where one economic actor, called the principal, can set the rules under which another economic 
actor, called the agent, operates. To maximise his utility, the agent chooses an action independently of the 
principal that nevertheless affects the principal’s utility; the agent’s utility function is different from that of the 
principal (Pushkarskaya, 2003) 
6 Free-ride refers to the situation in which ‘free-riders’ consume more than their fair share of a resource, or 
shoulder less than a fair share of the cost of its production. (Corner & Sandler., 1986)  
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because market instruments rely on profit generated to produce environmental 
protection (Anderson & Leal, 2001; Kosobud & Zimmerman, 1997; Stavins, 2003). 
Relying on the link between economic rationality and environmental outcomes, MBIs 
are able to bring about a ‘win-win’ situation for the treasury (raising revenue for the 
society), the environment (encouraging polluters to change their behaviours and/or 
using revenue raised to compensate environment al loss), and the economy (creating 
incentives for applying new pollution control technologies) (Baumol & Oates, 1988; 
Rietbergen-McCracken & Abaza, 2000, pp6-7). However, the application of market 
approaches in developing countries is criticised for many reasons. Bell (2003) argues 
that the four factors necessary for MBIs to succeed - namely transparency, accurate 
monitoring, realistic incentive to trade, and trust - are seldom present in developing 
countries. In similar vein, Blackman and Harrington (2000) stress that financial, 
institutional and political constraints make environmental policies much more 
problematic in developing countries than in industrialised countries.  
The second point of view argues that policy instruments should be based on 
the existing institutional capabilities of countries and political support (Cole & 
Grossman, 1999; Anderson, 2001; Soderholm, 2001; Bell, 2003). Direct regulations 
often get political support more easily than other instrument groups (O’Shea, 2002) 
because they explicitly give an assurance that pollution will not exceed a certain 
level. However, direct regulations (including both technology and performance 
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standards) are criticised as inflexible policies that create a disincentive for firms to 
invent, innovate and diffuse new technologies and ways of doing things (Jaffe, 
Newell & Starvins, 2003).  
In light of the second viewpoint, some authors suggest a hybrid mechanism in 
which there are some roles for government and others for markets (Donahue & Nye, 
2002). Anderson and Leal (2001) focus on assigning property rights instead of using 
MBIs. On the other hand, Hahn, Olmstead & Starvins, (2003) suggest using market 
incentives such as fees, taxes, and subsidies to achieve goals that are set politically. 
The debate on which instruments should be used to tackle environmental 
problems, in general or in specific cases, has been very active (Fisher et al., 1996; 
Keohane, Revesz & Stavins, 1998; Mickwitz, 2003; OECD, 2007). Appropriate criteria 
are important in assessing pollution control policy instruments. 
4.4 Normative criteria to assess pollution control policy instruments  
4.4.1 Literature review 
An evaluation of environmental policy instruments includes either ex-ante or 
ex-post analysis and each has its own assessment criteria. Ex-post analysis requires 
experiments of policy instruments and information on their outcomes. Such 
information is not available for TGCH Lagoon. Consequently, this study focuses on a 
normative, ex-ante analysis. The selection of normative criteria to assess 
environmental policy instruments ex ante is constrained by the principle of 
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sustainable development. According to the Brundtland Commission (1987), 
sustainable development is defined as development that meets the needs of the 
present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs. This definition contains two key concepts, including;  
- the concept of 'needs', in particular the essential needs of the world's poor; 
- the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organisation 
on the environment 's ability to meet present and future needs.  
 Choosing an appropriate policy instrument  requires reconciling among 
conflicting issues. Richards (2000) made a summary of assessment indicators used by 
other researchers and environmental organisations including Majone (1976), Bohm 
and Russell (1985), U.S Department of Energy (1989), Project 88–Round II (1991), 
Office of Technical Assessment (OTA) of U.S Congress (1995), and Hoel (1996) 
(Annex 3.1). All of these studies include criteria of static efficiency, cost -efficiency, 
political feasibility and administration burden. The criteria of environmental 
effectiveness and dynamic concern (i.e. incentives to develop new abatement 
technology and adaptability of policy instrument to changing conditions) were also 
adopted in most of these studies.  
 The above assessment criteria are also highly consistent with Revesz & Stavins 
(2007) who devise relevant questions for choosing environmental policy instrument, 
including:  
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- will the policy instrument achieve the stated goal or standard;  
- will it do so at the lowest possible cost, including both private-sector compliance 
and public-sector monitoring and enforcement;  
- will the instrument be flexible in the face of changes in tastes and technology;  
- will the instrument provide dynamic incentives for research, development, and 
adoption of better pollution abatement technologies;  
- will the implementation of the policy instrument result in an equitable distribution 
of the benefits and costs of environmental protection;  
- will the policy be politically feasible in terms of enactment and implementation;  
 The first question refers to the criterion of environmental effectiveness. The 
second question refers to both criteria of administrative feasibility and cost -
efficiency. The third and fourth questions refer to criteria of dynamic concerns.  The 
fifth and sixth questions refer to criteria of political feasibility.  
 Richards (2000) suggests that the ideal environmental policy instrument is one 
that minimises costs for society given the pollution abatement requirements and 
prevailing legal and political constraints. Costs for society include production costs, 
public finance impact, and transaction costs. Production cost refers to the actual 
capital, training, operation, maintenance, and management costs of producing 
emissions abatement or other environmental service. They are direct costs of 
controlling pollution. Public finance impact refers to the cost imposed on the system 
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of public finance related to an instrument’s revenue-raising requirements. 
Transaction costs include measurement costs and governance costs. Measurement 
costs refer to the resources dedicated to implementing, monitoring and evaluating 
the policy instrument. Governance costs are the costs of establishing and 
maintaining mechanisms to resolve conflict and adapt to changes. 
4.4.2 Proposed assessment criteria for pollution control policy instruments in the 
context of TGCH Lagoon 
 The foregoing literature review suggests that an environmental policy 
instrument should be assessed with many aspects. Accordingly, the assessment 
involves a set of criteria. Even though all criteria are important in theory, they should 
not be treated equally in practice as regulators must have different priorities in 
designing instruments. All assessment criteria of an environmental policy can be 
categorised into the first-order groups referring to the impact of the instrument on 
ambient environment and the second-order group referring to implications of 
environmental improvement on cost-benefit function of the society.   
 With regard to the first-order group, assessment criteria for pollution control 
policy instruments include environmental effectiveness of the instrument and its 
administrative feasibility. The environmental effectiveness of the instrument refers to 
the level of action forcing or rigidity that it imposes on polluters. Administrative 
feasibility refers to the extent to which the instrument to be practical, not incurring 
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excessive monetary or informational costs for its implementation and operation. The 
administrative feasibility depends on the costs of instrument incurred by regulatory 
agencies. The costs of an instrument include the cost of measurement (resources for 
implementing, monitoring and enforcing work) and cost of governance (resources 
for establishing and maintaining mechanisms to resolve conflict and adapt to 
changes). The governance cost is strongly dependent on the effectiveness of 
monitoring and enforcing.  
 With regard to the second-order group, an instrument can result in different 
implications for the cost-benefit function of the society. These implications are 
assessed with criteria including static efficiency, cost -efficiency, dynamic concerns, 
and political acceptability 
 Static efficiency refers to the optimal production level of polluters. An 
environmental instrument achieves static efficiency when it equates marginal 
abatement costs with marginal damages of pollution. It implies that regulators need 
to have complete information about marginal damages of pollution.  
 Cost-efficiency refers to the extent to which the instrument achieves the 
designed environmental goal at the least cost. This criterion will be satisfied if 
abatement costs among polluters who have the same marginal damages are 
equalised. It implies that regulators need to know the difference in marginal 
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damages of polluters. Accordingly, cost-efficiency can be considered as the 
necessary condition of static efficiency. 
Dynamic concern refers to the changes in a number of dynamic relationships. 
First, it involves response of farmers to the policy instrument (e.g. applying cleaner 
production technology, reducing production scale). Second, it involves response of 
farmers to changes in preferences, incomes, availability of production factors and 
technology in the business environment (e.g. substituting inputs). The responses of 
farmers both to the instrument and the business environment depend on how the 
instrument creates incentives and discretion for farmers. Third, it involves the 
adaptability of the environmental instrument to changes in the ecological 
environment (e.g. more pollution) and the socioeconomic environment (e.g. input 
and output prices). 
Political acceptability should be considered from both government and 
community perspectives. From the community perspective, the political acceptability 
of an environmental instrument is influenced by the political risks, and the ethical 
views of society in relation to the instrument. The political risk is influenced by effects 
of the environmental instrument on the size and distribution of costs and benefits of 
polluters, and the political influence of losers in particular. The ethical view of society 
on the instrument is affected by the compatibility of the instrument with the Polluter 
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Pays Principle7. Given the government structure in Vietnam, it is possibly for 
government to over-ride community concerns, albeit with subsequent enforcement 
challenges.  
                                               
7 The Polluter Pays Principle requires those responsible for producing pollution to 
pay for damage done to the natural environment. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ASSESSMENT OF MARKET-BASED POLICY OPTIONS FOR REDUCING 
EMISSION FROM AQUACULTURE FARMS IN TGCH LAGOON 
  
This chapter applies the criteria developed in Chapter 4 to assess transferable 
quotas for – and taxes on – outputs, inputs and pollution as suitable instruments to 
reduce emissions from aquaculture farms in TGCH Lagoon. This analysis assumes that 
the property right regime is unchanged and that these instruments are imposed by 
regulators on farmers who have private access to the lagoon bed and open access to 
the lagoon water. Chapter 6 considers a role for co-management of common 
property lagoon water.  
5.1 Transferable output quotas  
Environmental effectiveness 
The level of action forcing of transferable shrimp output quotas in the context 
of TGCH Lagoon is threatened by the substitutability of brackish aquaculture species. 
In fact, shrimps can and have been substituted with other brackish aquaculture 
species in the lagoon. The over-exploitation problem applies to all aquaculture 
production because the lagoon water is an open access resource and farmers can 
freely discharge polluted water from their farms. Consequently, a quota restricting 
only shrimp production would not be rigid. It is therefore necessary to consider and 
assess transferable quotas for all aquaculture products in the lagoon.  
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Marginal damage to the ambient environment will differ between species. 
Therefore, it is necessary to design distinct and non-convertible quotas for each 
aquaculture product. Alternatively, if quotas were convertible between species then 
the conversion ratios would need to be set according to the relative pollution 
associated with a unit of each species. The implication is that farmers would have to 
buy and sell quotas in order to alter their production mix. Such quotas, usually 
referred to as ‘individual transferable quotas’ or ITQs, have been applied to deep 
water fisheries in New Zealand with reasonable success (Costello, Gaines & Lynham, 
2008)  
The environmental effectiveness of output ITQs depends on whether or not 
the allowed quantity of each product can be sustained by the Lagoon. It follows that 
output ITQs may have to be adjusted frequently to accommodate increasing 
understanding of the Lagoon’s ecology. In a laboratory environment, a sustainable 
level of output can be achieved through an iterative process where regulators buy 
and sell quotas (or adjust quota levels) to individual farmers. However, this task is 
much more complicated in the context of TGCH Lagoon where sustainable levels of 
production also vary across the lagoon. 
Output ITQs would not be environmentally effective if they were applied 
‘across the board’ because the Lagoon’s capacity varies from one location to the next 
depending on local ecological and biological conditions. Consequently, output ITQs 
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would have to be location specific, providing for different average rates of 
exploitation by farmers in each location, and trading of quotas between locations 
would have to be prohibited. Administratively, this would require zoning of the 
lagoon into areas of similar marginal damage and the operation of decentralised 
quota markets.  
Administrative feasibility 
The measurement cost of transferable output quotas is mainly influenced by 
the cost of information (i.e. cost of collecting information about sustainable and 
actual production rates in different parts of the lagoon), the cost of establishing and 
maintaining quota markets, and monitoring costs. The first two kinds of cost depend 
largely on how output ITQs are implemented.  
First, regulators can initially allocate transferable output quotas to individual 
farmers by direct auction or by grandfathering. Grandfathering implies that farmers 
are allocated sufficient quota to produce at levels proportionally lower than their 
levels before the introduction of quotas. This implies that regulators must incur a 
substantial information cost to establish each farmer’s recent level of production. 
With direct auction, regulators offer the allowable ITQs to farmers who must bid for 
them. This reduces the regulator’s information cost but raises the issue of political 
feasibility (discussed later as a ‘political risk’).  
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Second, the cost of establishing quota markets depends largely on the type of 
market and level of decentralisation. Quota markets can be managed by regulators 
or left unmanaged. In the latter (laissez faire) case, the regulator does not facilitate 
quota transactions. Conversely, in a managed market, the regulator acts as an 
intermediary, providing information and enforcing contracts. While this is expected 
to reduce private transaction costs and to promote allocative efficiency, it imposes 
an additional cost on government. In the case of TGCH Lagoon, quota markets 
would require some management in order to prevent trades between quota zones. 
The more decentralised are these zones, the  higher will be the cost of managing 
quota markets.  
Apart form the information cost associated with grandfathering and managing 
quota markets, regulators also face technical information costs associated with 
zoning. These costs, and the cost of setting quota levels, would be ongoing due to 
changes in production technologies that impact on pollution, and increasing 
knowledge as to ecological sustainability limits.  
Third, the monitoring cost of this instrument is high. Monitoring could be 
applied to physical production on farms or to receipts issued at the point of sale. The 
former method is very time consuming because it is difficult to observe quantities 
produced in a pond or net enclosure. Monitoring sale receipts is much easier but 
potentially less effective because farmers have an incentive to behave 
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opportunistically and to sell products without receipts. Although quota holders may 
voluntarily assist regulators with monitoring (to protect their investment in quotas), 
the wide range of product buyers (Section 3.2.21) would still make it difficult for 
regulators and quota holders to prevent non-compliance. Consequently, output ITQs 
will also be burdened with high governance costs.   
Cost-efficiency and static efficiency 
Output ITQs would be cost-efficient if the marginal abatement costs of 
polluters whose emissions cause the same marginal damage are equated. Initially, 
the marginal abatement cost of farmers depends on how quotas are allocated. In the 
case of grandfathering, initial abatement costs are represented by the opportunity 
cost of reduced production. In the case of auction, the marginal abatement cost 
includes both this opportunity cost and the direct cost of buying output quotas. In 
the long-term, the marginal abatement costs of transferable quotas will reflect both 
opportunity and direct costs regardless of how the quotas were initially allocated. 
Therefore, even if zoning equalises the marginal damage of farmers within a quota 
zone, it would not be possible to administer output ITQs that equate exactly the 
marginal abatement cost of these farmers because they are likely to face different 
transaction costs when purchasing quota. Unit transaction costs may well differ 
between farmers depending on the scale of their production and on personal 
attributes like the ability to assemble and process information. Although well-
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administered output ITQs could achieve reasonable cost -efficiency, this would not 
imply the same for static efficiency because it would not be practical to measure the 
marginal damage of farmers.  
Dynamic concerns 
Transferable output ITQs impose an opportunity cost on less efficient farmers 
and therefore create an incentive for these farmers to sell or lease their quotas to 
more efficient farmers. The improvement of allocative efficiency is influenced by the 
type of quota markets established and their level of decentralisation. In case of 
laissez faire markets, smaller farmers could face prohibitively high unit transaction 
costs that prevent some efficiency-improving trades. Managed markets could reduce 
private transaction costs (adding to the gains in allocative efficiency) but only at the 
expense of higher information costs. Decentralisation of quota markets would also 
help to reduce private transaction costs but, again, there is a trade-off because 
allocative efficiency is compromised when ITQs cannot be transacted between quota 
zones (in order to preserve their environmental effectiveness). Under these 
conditions, the gains in allocative efficiency will be constrained by the total amount 
of quota issued for each different product in the quota zone. 
While output ITQ’s will allow individual farmers to respond to changes in their 
business environment (e.g. new technology and changes in relative prices) by buying 
and selling quotas, the extent of their responses will depend on the ability of 
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regulators to make appropriate adjustments in the product mix allowed in each 
quota zone. Regulators can adjust output ITQs by buying or selling quotas in the 
market or by making proportional adjustments to the level of output allowed by 
each quota. The revision of quota levels would need to be considered frequently 
because regulators do not have perfect information at the beginning and ecological 
conditions and technology are dynamic. Consequently, this policy instrument offers 
reasonable flexibility to regulators and gives farmers reasonable discretion in their 
production choices.  However, it does not create an incentive for farmers to adopt 
cleaner production technology.  
Political acceptability 
The political risk of output ITQs depends on how they affect the size and 
distribution of costs and benefits, and the political influence of losers in particular. If 
quotas are initially allocated through auction, farmers who are poorest in terms of 
liquidity will suffer the largest cuts in production and will benefit least from 
environmental improvement. Political risk could be high if these disaffected farmers 
have significant influence, even if other stakeholders (like mobile-gear fishers) stand 
to gain. This appears to be the case when viewed against the staunch resistance to 
government’s ‘top-down’ attempt to open waterways in TGCH Lagoon (Tuyen et al., 
2010). This risk could be reduced by grandfathering the ITQs as the costs and 
benefits of environmental improvement would then be shared by farmers in 
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proportion to their recent levels of output. However, even if ITQs are grandfathered, 
the fact that they are transferable opens the door to involuntary distress sales that 
leave some of the poorest farmers worse off. Ethically, transferable output ITQs can 
be defended on the grounds that the ‘polluter pays’ regardless of whether they are 
auctioned or grandfathered as all farmers bear the opportunity cost of reduced 
production. Political risk associated with output ITQs is therefore unlikely to originate 
from outside the farmer group. 
5.2 Assessment of transferable input quotas  
Environmental effectiveness 
First of all, the level of action forcing of transferable shrimp input quotas in 
TGCH Lagoon is threatened by the substitutability among aquaculture products 
(sub-section 5.1). Accordingly, as with output ITQs, input ITQs would need to be 
extended to all aquaculture species in the lagoon. In addition, input quotas would 
need to either be non transferable between species, or else transferability would 
occur using ratios that estimate the relative pollution associated with the level of 
production that is associated with use of a unit of input  when applied to each 
species.  
Given these issues, the input ITQ analysis in this thesis focuses  on seeds  
rather than feed, This is because, unlike with feed, the specific seed requirements for 
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each species are non substitutable between species, and also there are only limited 
options for changing the technology mix to compensate for low seed numbers.   
The level of action forcing of seed ITQs depends on whether the designed 
allowable amounts of seed for aquaculture species in TGCH Lagoon are set at levels 
that are consistent with ecological sustainability. As with output ITQs, trading of 
quotas between ecological zones would need to be prohibited. This would require 
zoning of the lagoon into areas of similar marginal damage and the operation of 
decentralised quota markets. 
Administrative feasibility       
Similarly to output ITQs, the costs of seed ITQs include information costs, the 
costs of establishing quota markets, and monitoring costs. The information costs 
depend on the chosen method for initial allocation of quotas, the type of quota 
markets, and the level of decentralisation. The technical information costs associated 
with zoning would be ongoing due to production technology innovations and 
increasing knowledge of ecological sustainability limits.    
A significant distinction between seed ITQs and other ITQs (either input or 
output) is the relative ease of monitoring for seed ITQs. This is because farmers no 
longer rely on seeds collected from wild sources (PECAAF, 2008), and there are only a 
small number of potential suppliers of commercial seeds.  Accordingly, the seed 
suppliers can be considered as “check points” in the monitoring system. However, 
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there would still be considerable governance costs to prevent opportunistic 
strategies by farmers who might attempt to find non-accredited seed providers.  
Cost-efficiency and static efficiency 
As with output ITQs, well-administered output ITQs could achieve reasonable 
cost-efficiency but would have low static efficiency. The low static efficiency occurs 
because it would not be practical to measure the marginal damage of farmers.  
Dynamic concerns 
Both output and seed ITQs impose opportunity costs on farmers who use 
their quotas inefficiently, and there is a market incentive for these less efficient 
farmers to sell their quotas to farmers who are more efficient. However, allocative 
efficiency also depends on the type of quota markets and the level of 
decentralisation, given that quotas would not be transferable between zones. As with 
output ITQs, there is no incentive for farmers to apply cleaner technologies.  
There is a subtle difference between seed ITQs and output ITQs in regard to 
the farmers’ responding to changes in the business environment. In case of output 
ITQs, farmers have complete discretion to minimise their production cost through 
applying the most appropriate input mix. In case of seed ITQs, the farmers’ ability to 
minimise production cost is partially limited due to the biological relationship 
between amount of used seed and other inputs.  
Political acceptability 
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Seed and output ITQs have similar political acceptability implications.  If seed 
ITQs are allocated through auction, then poor farmers will suffer the largest 
production reduction and obtain the least benefits from environmental 
improvement. Grandfathering of seed ITQs would reduce the political risk. In the 
long-term, the concentration of quotas amongst a limited number of farmers who 
are more efficient (regardless how seed ITQs being allocated) skews the income 
distribution among farmers and subsequently may cause some adverse effects on 
equity.  
5.3 Assessment of transferable pollution permits 
Environmental effectiveness   
In the context of TGCH Lagoon, transferable pollution permits have the 
highest level of action forcing in comparison with output and seed ITQs as this 
measure pertinently manages pollution discharged from aquaculture enclosures.  To 
be effective, these transferable pollution permits would need to be extended to all 
aquaculture products in the lagoon.  
Administrative feasibility 
Transferable pollution permits are administratively non feasible. This is 
because of the prohibitive cost of monitoring the non-point-source pollution from 
some thousands of small aquaculturalists who are transferring water between their 
ponds and the broader lagoon. Given this infeasibility of monitoring, which is a first-
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order criterion, it is not necessary to assess transferable pollution permits with other 
criteria. 
5.4 Assessment of output taxes 
Environmental effectiveness 
 First of all, due to the substitutability among aquaculture products, output 
taxes should be applied not only to shrimp culture but also other aquaculture 
activities in TGCH Lagoon.  The level of action forcing of output taxes depends on 
whether the tax rates are high enough to make farmers reduce their production scale 
to the desired level. In a theoretical environment, the optimal tax rate would be 
achieved after an iterative process.  However, it is much more difficult in the context 
of TGCH Lagoon where farmers are operating in a diverse bio-physical environment 
and face different production functions. Whereas output quotas have a direct impact 
on production, output taxes depend for their effectiveness on a set of unknown 
farmer response functions. Administratively, regulators would need to implement 
zoning of aquaculture production into areas of similar marginal damage as in the 
case of transferable output and seed quotas, and to tailor tax rates accordingly.  
 In the long run taxes should have the same level of action forcing compared 
with quota-based measures. However, taxes are likely to require more iterations to 
achieve this level of action forcing.    
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Administrative feasibility 
The measurement cost of output taxes is mainly determined by the 
information cost (i.e. cost of collecting information about sustainable production 
level in TGCH Lagoon), the monitoring cost and the cost of collecting the tax 
payments. Compared with grandfathering output and seed ITQs, the initial 
information cost of output taxes is lower as regulators do not have to collect 
information about production of individual farmers prior to implementation of the 
tax. However, the technical information costs associated with zoning of output taxes 
is ongoing and the same as for output ITQs and seed ITQs. Meanwhile, the 
monitoring cost of output taxes is relatively higher than quota-based instruments as 
it would be more difficult to prove non-compliance of farmers when there is no 
physical restriction. Further, the cost of collecting tax payments is likely to be higher 
than the cost of establishing quota markets as farmers have many opportunities for 
non compliance.  
Cost-efficiency and static efficiency  
In regard to cost-efficiency, the marginal abatement cost of farmers is 
represented by the tax rate. Assuming that the zoning of aquaculture is well-
administered, the differential tax rates would be tailored to the distinctive conditions 
of each aquaculture zone and would result in higher cost-efficiency compared with 
output ITQs and seed ITQs. This is because farmers would not have transaction costs 
    
115 
 
associated with buying and selling quotas to adjust their scale of production. 
However, due to the infeasibility of estimating marginal damages of individual 
aquaculture farms, output taxes bring about low static efficiency, as do output ITQs 
and input ITQs. 
Dynamic concerns 
Unlike output and input ITQs, output taxes do not provide a direct market 
incentive for less efficient farmers to sell their aquaculture rights to more efficient 
farmers; nor do they create an incentive for farmers to apply cleaner technology.   
Compared to both output and input ITQs, output taxes provide farmers with 
more flexibility to respond to exogenous changes in the business environment. This 
includes changing the input mix, changing the output mix of aquaculture species, 
and changing the scale of production. All of these could occur without transaction 
costs.   
In regard to modifying the instrument in response to new information as to 
ecological sustainability limits, output taxes might be less effective, at least initially, 
than either output or input ITQs. This is because of the new information 
requirements relating to farmer response functions to the adjusted tax. Tax rates 
would also need to be adjusted periodically to account for inflation.  
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Political acceptability 
The political risk of output taxes would be high because of opposition to the 
tax. There is a relevant issue as to whether all of the tax would be borne by producers 
or whether some of this would be transferred to consumers through an increase in 
the price of the aquaculture products. The share of the tax passed on to consumers 
would be determined by the price elasticity of demand for aquaculture products 
relative to the price elasticity of supply. However, since these output taxes would be 
applied only to aquaculture products from the TGCH Lagoon, the price elasticity of 
demand is likely to be very high because buyers can substitute TGCH aquaculture 
products with other products produced elsewhere in Vietnam. This implies that 
farmers in TGCH Lagoon rather than consumers would pay almost all of the tax. As 
well as paying the tax itself, farm income would be reduced through impact of the 
tax on production decisions. The overall cost to farmers would be higher than other 
options so far discussed, but the tax would provide revenue to government.   
5.5 Assessment of input taxes 
Environmental effectiveness 
The level of action forcing of shrimp input taxes depends on all aquaculture 
species being included. In addition, the taxes need to be set at a level such that 
farmers do modify their production decisions. Although in theory the appropriate tax 
rate equals the marginal damage rate, in practice there would be major challenges in 
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determining the correct figure.  The appropriate tax rates would have to be 
individually set for each zone in the lagoon.  
Administrative feasibility 
The measurement cost of aquaculture seed taxes mainly includes information 
cost (i.e. cost of collecting information about ongoing sustainable aquaculture scale 
in the lagoon), the monitoring cost and the cost of collecting tax payments. In the 
case of a tax on seed inputs, the costs could be minimised by requiring the sellers of 
the seed to collect the tax, thereby minimising the number of collection points.   
Administrative effectiveness would depend on farmers being required to keep their 
tax receipts provided by the sellers of seed.  
Cost-efficiency and static efficiency 
Aquaculture seed taxes have similar implications for cost-efficiency and static 
efficiency as do output taxes. Well-administered zoning of aquaculture is the 
precondition for these measures to achieve high cost -efficiency. Their cost-
efficiencies would be potentially higher than transferable output and seed ITQs as 
farmers would not have transaction costs associated with buying and selling quotas. 
Similarly to other measures, the infeasibility of estimating marginal damages of 
individual aquaculture farms would result in low static efficiency of seed taxes.   
Dynamic concerns  
As with output taxes, seed taxes have marked weaknesses for dealing with 
dynamic issues. First, seed taxes do not facilitate the improvement of allocative 
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efficiency through the transfer of production from less efficient to more efficient 
farmers. Second, they do not create an incentive for farmers to apply cleaner 
technology. Given that they are an indirect instrument, there are also likely to be 
ongoing adjustments required as the business environment changes, to ensure that 
the production response is consistent with ecological sustainability requirements. 
However, as with output taxes, it is possible for farmers to change the scale of 
production and the species production mix without incurring transaction costs. 
Political acceptability 
Both seed taxes and output taxes have high political risk due to the burden 
that they impose on farmers and the ongoing need for adjustment of the taxes. 
Farmers’ opposition is likely higher in the case of seed taxes as farmers have to pay 
tax before their production cycle and this tax payment would create some negative 
effects on farmers who often have low liquidity. Political risks of both seed taxes and 
output taxes are potentially higher than both grandfathering output and seed ITQs.  
5.6 Assessment of a pollution tax  
A pollution tax has the same fundamental problems of administrative 
infeasibility as is the situation for transferable pollution quotas.  These problems 
arise from the non point source characteristics of the pollution and the difficulty in 
measuring specific pollution levels from individual farms. Accordingly, pollution 
taxes are excluded from further consideration as possible policy instruments.  
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5.7 Synthesis and concluding remarks 
The purpose of this final section is to draw on the preceding analyses within 
this chapter to determine a preferred policy instrument.  Accordingly, the 
instruments are now given qualitative grading for each criterion (Table 5.1) 
consistent with these previous analyses.  
It is apparent from this synthesis that all of the considered instruments have 
potential to address the level of pollution, but only one, being that of seed input 
quotas, has high administrative feasibility. This superior administrative feasibility 
derives directly from the supply chain characteristics of seed being supplied by only 
a limited number of suppliers. In addition, there is already a need for monitoring at 
this point of the supply chain to minimise disease transfer.  Given that administrative 
feasibility is a key first order condition, seed ITQs therefore become the preferred 
instrument.  
Despite seed ITQs being the preferred instrument, there are considerable 
challenges to implementation. First there is the need for technical assessments to be 
made to create the lagoon zones within which quotas would be transferable. These 
zones would need to be determined primarily on ecological factors, but also taking 
into account administrative communities (such as communes and districts). Second, 
there are technical assessments required as to the aggregate quotas for each zone. If 
substitution between the various species is to be permitted, then the appropriate 
    
120 
 
quota substitution ratios must be determined. Third, there are judgments required as 
to the basis for the initial allocations. If these are to be grandfathered based on a 
proportion of existing production, then there are considerable information 
requirements as to the current production of each farmer. Fourth, administrative 
structures need to be created so that quotas can be traded. Fifth, there will be 
significant governance requirements to control opportunistic behaviours of farmers 
who try to obtain seed from non approved sources.  
All of the above challenges are more likely to be successfully dealt with if 
there is co-management between government and the user groups in each zone of 
the lagoon.  This issue of co-management is considered in Chapter 6.  
                  02/02 
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Table 5.1: Synthesis of policy instrument assessments 
 
Instruments  
Criteria  
Output quotas Seed quotas Pollution 
quotas 
Output 
taxes 
Seed 
taxes 
Pollution 
taxes 
Environmental effectiveness HIGH HIGH VERY HIGH HIGH HIGH VERY 
HIGH 
Administrative feasibility 
- Measurement cost 
- Governance cost 
LOW 
HIGH 
HIGH 
HIGH 
LOW 
HIGH 
 VERY LOW 
VERY HIGH 
VERY HIGH 
LOW 
HIGH 
HIGH 
 LOW 
HIGH 
HIGH 
VERY LOW 
VERY HIGH 
VERY HIGH 
Cost-efficiency MODERATE MODERATE  HIGH HIGH  
Static efficiency LOW LOW  LOW LOW  
Dynamic concerns 
- Response of farmers to the instrument 
- Response of farmers to business 
environment 
- Adaptability of the instrument 
VERY HIGH 
HIGH 
HIGH 
 
HIGH 
HIGH 
HIGH 
LOW 
 
HIGH 
 LOW 
LOW 
HIGH 
 
LOW 
LOW- 
LOW 
LOW 
 
LOW 
 
Political acceptability 
- Political risk 
HIGH 
LOW 
 
HIGH 
LOW 
 
 LOW 
HIGH 
 
LOW 
HIGH 
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CHAPTER 6 
CO-MANAGEMENT TO REDUCE EMISSIONS ON AQUACULTURE 
FARMS IN TGCH LAGOON 
 
Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2.2, noted that the Provincial Government had given its 
support to a co-management experiment in which some control over shared lagoon 
resources was devolved to local user groups in certain parts of TGCH Lagoon. These 
user groups or ‘Fishery Associations’ were given legal recognition in 2005 and are 
therefore entitled to receive and administer fishing rights on behalf of the users 
(Tuyen et al., 2010). Although the co-management approach supported by Provincial 
Government since 2004 accommodates a shift from open access to common 
property lagoon water, the experiment has focused on negotiations with user groups 
to devise and implement their own ways of opening waterways (Tuyen et al., 2010). 
As noted in Chapter 4, this is a necessary step toward restoring and maintaining the 
productive capacity of the Lagoon but not necessarily a sufficient condition as it 
does not address the problem of high emissions caused by farmers over-exploiting 
lagoon water. This chapter draws on the findings presented in Chapter 5 to propose 
an extension of the co-management strategy initiated in TGCH Lagoon that is aimed 
at reducing emission levels on aquaculture farms.  
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Chapter 6 comprises three sections. The first section reviews co -management 
as an appropriate strategy to manage common pool resources used by aquaculture 
farmers in the context of TGCH Lagoon. The second section describes recent efforts 
to introduce a co-management strategy in parts of the Lagoon and the final section 
proposes an extension of this experimental work that draws on the analysis 
conducted in Chapter 5.     
6.1 Co-management as the appropriate form of common property management 
in TGCH Lagoon  
Resource management refers to decisions governing actions taken to use and 
conserve natural resources. According to Ostrom (2002), these decisions determine:  
- who is allowed to appropriate resource units; 
- the timing, quantity, location, and technology of appropriation; 
- who is obliged to contribute resources to provide or maintain the resource system 
itself; 
- how appropriation and obligation activities are to be monitored and enforced; 
- how conflicts over appropriation and obligation activities are to resolved; and 
- how the rules affecting the above will be changed over time with changes in the 
performance of the resource system and the strategies of participants. 
The last point emphasises the need for an adaptive management model (i.e. 
learning-by-doing) to deal with uncertainty and complexity. This is particularly 
    
124 
 
important in the case of TGCH Lagoon owing to its dynamic environmental, 
technological and market conditions.    
 Kooiman (2003) recognises three models of governance: hierarchical 
governance characterised by state intervention, self-governance, and co-governance 
consisting of collaboration and interplay among different actors for managing 
common pool resources. Co-governance by public–private–civil society partnerships 
has emerged as a way of dealing with the shortcomings of self-governance and of 
single agency, top-down management (Kooiman, 2003).    
The analysis presented in Chapter 5 suggests that grandfathering 
decentralised seed ITQs holds promise as an effective instrument to control water 
pollution generated by aquaculture farms in TGCH Lagoon. However, this strategy 
poses significant challenges to the state in terms of administrative feasibility, 
including high costs of monitoring and sanctioning opportunistic behaviour, 
gathering technical information, and managing decentralised quota markets. Some 
of these costs could potentially be reduced by empowering community-based 
organisations to take ownership of, and responsibility for, well-defined areas of 
lagoon water  
Meinzen-Dick (2009, p328) argues that collective action by the users of a 
common pool water resource is necessary to reduce the administrative burden of 
natural resource management because users have the best knowledge of the 
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resource and its use, and a strong incentive to maintain the resource over time. She 
also argues that it is necessary to devolve rights and control to user groups (like 
Fishery Associations) in order to realise these knowledge and incentive advantages 
(Meinzen-Dick, 2009, p325).  
Collective action is, of course, not cost free. The costs incurred by members of 
a user group in managing a common property may be prohibitively high when: 
- the resource is large and its boundaries poorly defined (Ostrom, 1990 & 1992; 
Bardhan, 1993), 
- the resource is not homogeneous (Ostrom, 1990), 
- members of the group are not homogenous with respect to their interest in 
the resource (Olson, 1971; Naidu, 2005). This is more likely when the group is 
large (Ostrom, 1990 & 1992; Bromley, 1992; Bardhan, 1993; Nugent, 1993 
White & Runge, 1995),  
- and members of the group do not live close to the resource (Wade, 1988; 
Ostrom, 1990).   
Clearly, the costs of collective action in TGCH Lagoon would be prohibitively 
high if all aquaculture farmers were grouped into a single user group as this would 
result in a large resource and high levels of resource and membership heterogeneity. 
Under these circumstances it would be virtually impossible for members of the user 
group to reach agreement on rules governing individual use of the resource, to 
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police these rules and to sanction rule-breakers. Instead, rights and control would 
have to be devolved to a number of user groups, each with members reasonably 
homogeneous in their use of the resource, and each responsible for its local, well-
defined and reasonably homogeneous part of the Lagoon. This coincides well with 
the notion of Fishery Associations, which - according to Tuyen et al. (2010) - operate 
at the village or sub-village level and comprise of members who share similar aquatic 
resource exploitation practices.  
 While promoting the likelihood of collective action, the decentralisation of 
user groups confronts the problem that lagoon water is mobile and its movement 
cannot be constrained by boundaries on its surface, no matter how well t hey are 
defined. This reality will encourage continued over-exploitation of the lagoon water 
if user groups are able to externalise the cost of their pollution to other users 
without sanction. Meinzen-Dick (2009, p328) argues that government has a cost 
advantage at this aggregate level in providing scientific information about 
sustainable exploitation rates and resolving conflicts between user groups. She 
concludes that an adaptive form of co-management is most appropriate for 
common pool resources that are highly variable over space and time. This is certainly 
true of TGCH Lagoon.  
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6.2 Current co-management strategy in TGCH Lagoon   
Section 4.2.2.2 of Chapter 4 describes the provincial government’s failed 
attempt to open channels in TGCH Lagoon by instructing farmers to remove net-
enclosures from demarcated waterways. Confronted with firm resistance from the 
owners of net enclosures, this top-down approach was abandoned in the early 
2000’s in favour of co-management, a collaborative strategy in which some control 
over shared lagoon resources would be devolved to local Fishery Associations. In 
2004 the provincial government initiated an experiment in co-management involving 
the different tiers of government, lagoon users and researchers based at Hue 
University of Agriculture and Forestry (HUAF). The HUAF research team had been 
working with users in the Sam Chuon area of TGCH Lagoon since 1996 in an attempt 
to resolve conflicts over access to lagoon resources.   
A participatory action learning approach was ado pted to negotiate informed 
agreements with Fishery Associations. According to Tuyen et al. (2010), the approach 
aimed to: (i) build a shared understanding among user groups and stakeholders with 
regards to current lagoon resource use, livelihood problems, priorities, and 
appropriate management approaches; (ii) introduce a more participatory approach 
to lagoon resource governance and to resolve conflicts; (iii) strengthen community 
organisations and to create conditions for co-management; (iv) facilitate learning 
between stakeholders (i.e., village, commune, district and province) and develop a 
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consensus for co-management as an appropriate approach; and (v) identify methods 
to support the ‘scaling up’ of the approach more generally (Tuyen et al., 2010). In 
order to address the livelihood conflict between mobile gear fishers on the one hand 
and fixed gear fishers and farmers on the other, negotiations focused on the 
problem of opening waterways between net -enclosures to improve access to the 
Lagoon’s common fishing grounds.   
The co-management strategy was given impetus in 2005 by Provincial 
Decision No. 4260 which provided for the allocation of access and use rights to 
Fishery Associations (FAs). As noted in the previous section, FAs operate at different 
administrative levels, starting at the village or sub-village level to ensure that 
members share similar aquatic resource exploitation practices (for example, farmers 
using net enclosures). The strategy views co-management as the sharing of power 
and responsibility for decision making between FAs and the state, with the state 
allocating access and use rights to FAs rather than to individual households (Tuyen et 
al., 2010). Each FA is expected to develop a formal constitution (bylaw) outlining 
membership and operating procedures, and to play a role in planning and managing 
aquatic resources.   
Tuyen et al. (2010) believe that the co-management experiment has produced 
some promising results: local government has benefited from participatory learning; 
local visions and strategies for resource use have shifted from top-down and short-
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term to participatory, long-term and integrated with the ecosystem; awareness and 
capacity for participatory planning and management have been strengthened; and 
users are better organised to respond to problems. They also acknowledge 
significant challenges: FAs do not yet have the capacity to make and enforce their 
own management decisions, or to finance their operations; technically it is difficult to 
allocate rights to FAs small enough to avoid heterogeneity in user interests; and FAs 
evolve at different rates with different and perhaps conflicting purposes. Despite 
these challenges, three of the four experimental communes in the Sam Chuon area 
of TGCH Lagoon had made some progress towards opening their waterways by 
2006.   
Although modest, these achievements are not trivial as they emphasise the 
potential for successful co-management. As suggested in Section 4.2.2.2, co-
management leading to an acceptable level of compensation for property lost to 
waterways would no doubt help to expedite this necessary process. However, 
opening the waterways is not a sufficient condition to restore and maintain ambient 
water quality while farmers are able to externalise the costs of over-exploitation. For 
this reason, co-management must also address the problem of high emissions on 
aquaculture farms in TGCH Lagoon. The analysis in Chapter 5 suggests that 
grandfathering decentralised seed ITQs holds promise in this regard but faces 
serious challenges in respect of administrative burdens. Section 6.3 argues that these 
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challenges could be mitigated by encouraging FAs to adopt seed ITQs as a co-
management strategy. 
6.3 Towards adaptive co-management in TGCH Lagoon 
As noted in Chapter 5, grandfathering decentralised seed ITQs would burden 
the state with high costs of monitoring and sanctioning opportunistic behaviour, 
gathering technical information, and managing decentralised quota markets. Section 
6.1 suggests that adequately empowered FAs could be instrumental in reducing 
some of these costs. First, the cost of monitoring farmer compliance is expected to 
decline because members of FAs have an incentive to police the actions of other 
members, and rule-breakers would find it difficult to conceal their opportunistic 
behaviour from their neighbours.  
Second, FAs could limit their members’ opportunistic behaviour in reporting 
their actual production levels when governmental agencies collect this information 
to initially allocate seed ITQs. This is because it is in the interest of all members of a 
FA that their fellow members do not over report their initial production, as over-
reporting reduces the grandfathered quotas of other members. Third, the availability 
of detailed information about the production situation of FA members would make 
FAs able to collect information on quota supply and demand more easily than 
governmental agencies. Accordingly, FAs could reduce the cost of managing 
decentralised quota markets.   
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Given the availability of detailed knowledge and the strong incentive to 
maintain the resource, FAs also have advantages for the enforcement of sanctions 
compared with formal courts that are often geographically distant from local 
farmers. FAs also have the potential to work out sanctions with relatively lower cost 
and to use group pressure to prevent farmers from violating their allocated quotas.   
Paralleling with the advantages, FAs face a challenge in collecting technical 
information about the sustainable production level in different parts of the lagoon 
by themselves., In comparison, governmental agencies would have more advantages 
in collecting  such information as they have better technical capacity. Besides, FAs 
have limited power to impose sanctions on other groups who pollute the water 
resource. Accordingly, the involvement of governmental agencies in setting zonal 
quotas, providing technical assistance, and resolving conflicts among FAs, would be 
essential for successful co-management in TGCH Lagoon.   
Considering all of these arguments, it is recommended that decentralised 
seed ITQs should be implemented in conjunction with adaptive co-management 
between FAs and government. However, it is also recognised that this does not 
provide a complete solution to the sustainability issue. Accordingly, the decentralised 
input ITQs would need to be combined with efforts to opening the waterways, and 
linked to other measures to regulate emissions from agricultural lands and urban 
communities external to the lagoon (the investigation of which lies outside the 
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bounds of this thesis). It is also noted that further policies may be necessary, also 
potentially implemented from within a co-management framework, to encourage 
cleaner technologies.  
       
    
133 
 
CHAPTER 7 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the TGCH shrimp supply chain in 
order to identify factors constraining the chain and to suggest ways of improving its 
performance Owing to a lack of adequate prior information, it was decided to 
conduct the investigation in two phases starting with an exploratory study of dyadic 
relationships within the chain. The findings of this first stage were intended to inform 
the research questions to be addressed in the second stage of the study. The 
exploratory research was qualitative and employed a case study research strategy. 
Semi-structured, open-ended interviews were conducted with supply chain 
participants in April and May 2009. The respondents were purposively selected to 
span a wide range of dyadic transactions. Constructs used to guide the line of 
questioning and to analyse the data were drawn primarily from value chain and 
supply chain literature, especially the work of Mentzer et al. (2001), Collins et al. 
(2001) and Trkman and McCormack (2009), and from theories of industry 
development (Van de Ven & Garud, 1989). 
The exploratory research showed clearly that improved shrimp supply chain 
outcomes were dependent on addressing the issue of pollution in the Lagoon.. 
Technical information indicated that although there were multiple sources of 
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contamination, the key source was the endogenous pollution generated by the 
shrimp industry itself. This finding informed a second set of research questions 
seeking appropriate pollution control instruments, institutions and policy 
recommendations to strengthen the Lagoon’s shrimp supply chain. The second stage 
of this study employed a normative, analytical research strategy informed by 
economic theory and some key informants to explain why recent changes in 
property rights to lagoon resources had encouraged shrimp farmers to adopt overly 
intensive production methods, and to construct a set of possible pollution 
abatement instruments and criteria to assess these instruments in order to 
recommend an appropriate policy instrument. The theory applied in this second 
stage of the study was drawn primarily from literature in the fields of environmental 
economics and natural resource management.  
7.2 Research questions and answers 
 Research question 1: What is the current situation of the supply chain for shrimp 
produced from the TGCH Lagoon? 
The TGCH shrimp supply chain was not performing well, with problems at 
each transaction point. From the input suppliers to farmers, transactions involving 
seed - a key input - were affected by poor quality management. From farmers to 
wholesalers, many loan defaults were occurring, and the trust -based relationship 
between farmers and wholesalers was undermined. Farmers blamed the loan 
defaults on serious yield losses. From wholesalers to processor-exporters, there was 
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inadequate information sharing and poor quality management. Processor-exporters 
often informed wholesalers of the price, quantity and quality of shrimp that they 
needed only 3-7 days prior to the transaction, with adverse consequences for 
coordination with farmers. They relied only on shrimp size to assess quality and no 
recognised quality standards (e.g. TCM, HACCP) were applied. Finally, the evidence 
showed that the shrimp supply chain faced to a lot of contractual failures among 
business actors.  
Research question 2: What are the key constraints to improved chain performance? 
The local shrimp industry changed dramatically after the outbreak of 
widespread and persistent disease in 2004, which reduced both quantity and quality 
of shrimp product throughout the Lagoon. The resulting yield risk made it 
impossible to fulfil supply contracts all along the shrimp supply chain. In short, 
relational contracts were damaged by environmental uncertainty as heightened yield 
risk undermined efforts to coordinate value-adding activities, rendering the supply 
chain ineffective. 
The spread of shrimp diseases in TGCH Lagoon was attributed to water 
pollution. Although there are multiple sources of pollution in the Lagoon, intensive 
aquaculture - and shrimp culture in particular - is regarded as the main cause of 
pollution harming the shrimp industry. Intensive production methods were facilitated 
by the privatisation of the Lagoon bed as farmers were able to fully internalise the 
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benefits of their investment in aquaculture. However, in the absence of well-defined 
property rights to the Lagoon’s water, shrimp farmers over-intensified as they were 
also able to externalise the costs of their water pollution. In addition, the process of 
privatisation was not well regulated as zoning was not implemented and natural 
waterways were blocked by earthen walls and fine-mesh nets. This aggravated the 
pollution problem as the blockages prevent natural dissipation of contaminants. 
 Research question 3: What are the alternative policy options for dealing with 
pollution that harms shrimp production in the TGCH Lagoon? 
TTH government attempted to open blocked waterways by forcibly removing 
fine-mesh nets and, more recently, through a pilot project involving co-management 
in which some control over resources was devolved to local Fishery Associations in 
certain parts of the Lagoon. However, compensation has been an obstacle as the 
Government has offered compensation only to pond farmers in possession of Red 
Book property rights, and the amount of compensation offered has been well below 
market prices paid for ponds. A more generous compensation policy may help to 
expedite the opening of waterways. Even so, opening the waterways is unlikely to be 
sufficient given the incentive that farmers have to over intensify their production.  
For this reason, the study focused on policy options to reduce emissions from 
shrimp ponds. The range of policy options investigated included regulations (non-
transferable inputs and output quotas) and market-based measures (transferable 
input quotas, transferable output quotas, transferable pollution permits, inputs and 
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output taxes, and pollution taxes). In addition, co-management was investigated, 
whereby there would be a shift from open to common property, with rates of 
exploitation governed by rules established and enforced by or with user groups.  
Non-transferable input and output quotas were subsequently excluded as 
options as their monitoring and enforcement challenges are no different from those 
confronting transferable input and output quotas, yet they have lower allocative 
efficiency. Direct pollution quotas and taxes were also excluded owing to 
insurmountable monitoring and enforcement problems. 
Privatisation of TGCH Lagoon water (in contrast to the lagoon bed) is not 
considered to be practical given the nature of the flows of water between 
aquaculture enclosures and the greater lagoon. However, unitisation - whereby local 
management zones would be created within the lagoon- was considered to be a 
realistic possibility. Unitisation and an associated co-management regime were 
viewed as enabling institutional arrangements, whereas quotas and taxes were 
treated as policy instruments. Owing to the presence of substitute aquaculture 
products and species, the assessment of policy instruments was extended to 
encompass all aquaculture products and species in TGCH Lagoon.  
Research question 4: What is the most promising policy option to result in 
sustainable aquaculture production in TGCH Lagoon? 
Policy options were assessed accordingly to a set of normative criteria 
including environmental effectiveness, administrative feasibility, cost-efficiency, 
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dynamic concerns, and political acceptability. Of these criteria, environmental 
effectiveness and administrative feasibility were considered to be first-order and the 
others second order.  
Input transferable quotas (ITQs) for seed are considered the most promising 
instrument. This potential derives from the supply chain characteristics, as there are 
only a limited number of seed suppliers and there is already a need (irrespective of 
ITQs) for quality management procedures to be applied at the level of the supplier-
farmer dyad. There is also limited scope for substituting other inputs for seed. In 
comparison, monitoring and enforcement  of output quotas is considered 
administratively more difficult, given the multiple selling options.  Relative to taxes, 
ITQs are considered to be preferable in that action-forcing is direct and not 
dependent on uncertain farmer responses. Further, opposition within the 
communities is likely to be less strong for quotas than for taxes. 
 Tradability of ITQs would be limited to intra-zone and not inter-zone within 
the Lagoon. For ethical and political reasons, the initial quotas would be 
grandfathered to producers in proportion to their existing production levels.   
 Seed ITQs are more likely to be effective if undertaken in association with a 
co-management regime based on communities of similar fishing practices and within 
zones where the ecological conditions are homogeneous. The Government would 
retain an important role within the co-management regime, given the needs for 
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ongoing ecological information and associated expertise, and the need for 
facilitating, monitoring, adjusting and, where necessary, enforcing the trading 
regime.  
One of the weaknesses of seed ITQs is that they do not provide incentives for 
farmers to use cleaner technologies. This is also a weakness of all of the other 
instruments considered in this thesis except for direct pollution taxes, which were 
eliminated on the grounds of being administratively impractical. However, unitisation 
within a co-management regime would provide potential for operating rules to 
include specific pollution-reducing technologies. 
7.3 Contribution to knowledge 
Much of the supply chain literature views a supply chain as a flow of products, 
services, finance and information from a source to a customer. Some authors (e.g. 
Van de Ven & Garud, 1989) take a somewhat broader view that includes not only the 
instrumental sub-system (i.e. flow of products) but also the procurement and 
institutional sub-systems. Although this broader view embraces more fully the 
implications of institutional change and risks in procurement, the supply chain 
literature pays little attention to these very important aspects of chains for products 
grown by farmers using shared natural resources. This represents a serious gap in 
the literature as these chains often support large numbers of poor households and 
involve valuable environmental resources.  
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The ‘biological chain’ investigated in this study highlights an important 
concept that helps to integrate the rather distinct bodies of literature relating to 
supply chains on the one hand and environmental economics and natural resource 
management on the other. This concept relates to the distinction between 
behavioural risk and environmental risk, a distinction made by Williamson (1985, 
1996) and more recently by Trkman and McCormack (2009).  In general, the supply 
chain literature accepts the view that increasing uncertainty tends to drive relational 
contracting and hence tighter coordination of the chain. However, Williamson’s 
(1985) argument linking relational contracting to uncertainty dealt specifically with 
behavioural risk (i.e. opportunism). Trkman and McCormack (2009) recognise the 
distinction between behavioural and environmental risk and contend that an 
increasing level of environmental risk (as opposed to behavioural risk) will undermine 
chain coordination. The findings of the exploratory research conducted in this study 
confirm these views. Long standing relational contracts that once characterised the 
TGCH shrimp supply chain collapsed in the face of increasing yield volatility. 
Studies of biological supply chains, especially those heavily reliant on 
common pool resources, need to distinguish clearly between behavioural and 
environmental risk, and therefore need to embrace a broad view of the chain from 
the outset. Useful recommendations to improve the performance of a particular 
chain may well require knowledge beyond the usual bounds of supply chain 
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management, including knowledge of property rights, social demographics, cultural 
norms, ecological systems, production technology and policy instruments.    
7.4 Limitations of the study 
The qualitative methodology used to studying the TGCH shrimp supply chain 
has its own strengths and weaknesses. Its strength comes from its suitability for 
exploratory analyses based on research questions but no prior hypotheses. In this 
study, it was this philosophy that allowed emergence of key insights relating to 
pollution as the underlying driver of supply chain problems. The weakness of the 
qualitative approach relates to inevitable subjectivity, with the researcher being part 
of the research instrument. Further, the purposive nature of the sampling can lead to 
questions as to the representativeness of the findings.   
Pollution in the TGGH Lagoon has both exogenous and endogenous sources. 
Within the bounds of this thesis the focus has been on endogenous pollution from 
within the aquaculture industries. It is recognised that a comprehensive solution to 
the problems of the lagoon requires consideration to be given to both exogenous 
and endogenous sources. The findings of this study are based on published evidence 
plus fieldwork conducted within the bounds of the PhD. Given the complexity and 
heterogeneity of conditions within the lagoon, validation of the current situation in 
the lagoon would need to occur before implementation of the recommended 
strategies.  
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7.5 Further research  
 This study would have benefited from better information about the different 
sources of pollution impacting TGCH Lagoon and the shrimp producing areas in 
particular. The feasibility of enforcing seed ITQs across all species needs to be 
investigated. In addition, quantitative estimates of the costs and benefits of seed 
ITQs are needed. Similar studies should also be conducted for the major exogenous 
sources of pollution. At the same time, the Government should be promoting 
research into cleaner production technologies for aquaculture.  
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APPENDIX 3.1 
LIST OF INTERVIEWED BUSINESS PLAYERS IN THE SHRIMP  
SUPPLY CHAIN 
 
Business players Name 
 
 
 
 
Farmers 
Mr. Nguyen Xuan Anh 
Mr. Le Van Ben 
Mr. Duong Hoa 
Mr. Tran Thuy 
Mr. Do Anh Dung 
Mr. Le Be 
Mr. Nguyen Thuat 
Mr. Nguyen Huynh 
Mr. Tran Van Bon 
Mr. Nguyen Dinh Ai 
 
 
Middlemen 
Mrs. Le Thi Tuyet 
Mr. Phan Van Chau 
Mrs. Le Thi Nghia 
Mrs. Hoang Thi Ai 
 
 
Wholesales 
Thanh Tin Ltd Company 
Thanh Dong Ltd Company 
Mr. Huynh Dien 
Mr. Nguyen Duc Tri 
Mrs. Tran Thi Thanh Van   
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Processing & exporting 
companies 
Song Phu Ltd Company 
 
Domestic retailers 
Mrs. La Thi Hai 
Mrs. Hoang Mai 
Mrs. Tran Thi Chau 
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APPENDIX 3.2 
INTERVIEW GUIDE: THE EVOLUTION OF SHRIMP BUSINESS IN TGCH 
LAGOON 
 
 The development process of their businesses (how they started their 
businesses, how their businesses evolved and the reasons);  
 Their current functions in the shrimp supply chain (what function they 
performed, advantages and disadvantages of performing those functions);  
 The current situation of their business (availability of production factors, cost 
of production, revenue);  
 Accessibility to inputs (what inputs they need, where and how they buy inputs, 
how the price is established, how payment is made, how quality is 
maintained);  
 Relationships with input providers (the form of contracts, how often they are 
in contact with input providers, what and how information is exchanged 
between them and input providers, how they share risks, how they settle 
conflicts);  
 Accessibility to customers (what products they sell, where and how they sell 
products, how the price is established, how the payment is made, how quality 
is maintained); and 
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 Relationships with buyers (the form of contracts, how often they are in contact 
with buyers, what and how information is exchanged between them and 
buyers, how they share risks, how they settle conflicts).  
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APPENDIX 3.3 
LIST OF INTERVIEWED KEY INFORMANTS FROM THE 
INSTITUTIONAL SUB-SYSTEM 
 
Name of key 
informants 
Position Name of organisations 
Mr. Le Huu Toan Vice director TTH Provincial Extension Centre of Agriculture, 
Aquaculture and Forestry, Department of 
Agriculture and Rural Development in TTH 
Province 
Mrs. Do Thu Hong Vice director Office of Aquaculture, Department of Agriculture 
and Rural Development in TTH Province 
Mr. Pham Quyen Coordinator Fisheries Sector Program Support (2nd Stage) in 
TTH Province, Department of Agriculture and 
Rural Development in TTH Province 
Mrs. Lien Vice director TTH Provincial Veterinary Services, Department of 
Agriculture and Rural Development in TTH 
Province 
Mr. Van Director Office of Rural Development and Quality 
Management for Agricultural products, 
Department of Agriculture and Rural 
Development in TTH Province 
Mr. Nguyen Quang 
Vinh Binh 
Director Office of Aquatic Resources Protection and 
Exploitation, Department of Agriculture and Rural 
Development in TTH Province.  
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Mr. Hoang Mai Lan Vice-head Office of Agriculture, Department of Planning and 
Investment in TTH Province 
Mr. Nguyen Van 
Phuc 
Officer Provincial People’s Committee in TTH Province 
 
